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Summary 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine whether or not the legal 
framework to govern the Arctic can be said to be in place already, or if 
additional judicial measures need to be taken, given the future that awaits 
the region as a result of the ongoing rapid ice melt. For many decades, or 
even centuries, it was the common perception that the Arctic would remain 
permanently ice-covered, and because of this the prospects of any 
commercial development were small. With no commercial activities in 
sight, there was no real need to consider if legal measures needed to be 
taken concerning such issues. The climate change has during the last 40 
years or so proved that the Arctic does, and will to an even further extent, 
practically melt. This will bring with enormous consequences for the Arctic 
and international environment: Wildlife will have to adjust to a whole new 
way of living, and sea levels around the world will rise and engender a new 
cartography – just to name two. Less ice in the Arctic will also bring with 
more positive consequences. Transpolar shipping will be much easier and 
safer to conduct, hydrocarbon resources located in the sea bed will be easier 
to extract, and other commercial activities such as fishing and tourism can 
be developed and turn the Arctic into a blooming economy. This is precisely 
why there might be a need to revise the legal framework in place for the 
Arctic region, and develop whatever instruments are missing in order to 
achieve a sustainable development where environmental protection is not 
infringed in favor of making the largest profits possible.   
 
While most of the Arctic region is under national jurisdiction, there are also 
communal areas that cannot be claimed by any state. The region is not 
regulated by any comprehensive treaty or similar legal instrument, as 
opposed to the other polar region - the Antarctic. The multilateral or 
international legal instruments governing the Arctic are among others: The 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), regulating the sea in general 
and containing provisions on maritime jurisdictional delimitation and 
maritime environmental protection. And, the international Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), focused on limiting, or 
prohibiting, oil and other harmful substances from being discharged into the 
sea. Extra protection is offered to so-called special areas, of which the 
Arctic Ocean has none.  
 
Since it has been projected that the Arctic Ocean Sea Bed will contain large 
amounts of hydrocarbon resources, coastal states are eager to claim rights to 
exploit such resources by acquiring extended Continental Shelf areas. This 
is done in collaboration with the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, in which the process is very lengthy. Not many 
delimitation recommendations have been produced so far to clarify the 
possible extended Continental Shelves in the region.  
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An ice-free Arctic will equal more accessible shipping routes, which will be 
much shorter than the ones currently in use for transcontinental shipping. 
The remoteness and special character of the Artic Ocean will place rigorous 
demands on vessel construction and crew capacity. Shipping and vessel-
source pollution is dealt with through a number of international 
organizations and instruments, as well as on a national level. On a regional 
level the Arctic Council has recently produced legally binding instruments 
on Maritime Search and Rescue and Oil Spill Prevention and Response. 
Within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) work for creating a 
mandatory Polar Code on Arctic shipping is currently being undertaken.  
 
In the Nordic countries there seems to be a will to transform the Arctic 
Council from a decision-shaping to a decision-making body, and widen the 
mandate in regards to what policy issues that are being dealt with. There is 
also a strive towards more and especially more detailed legal regulations of 
the Arctic region. A will to intensify cooperation on military and security 
issues can also be detected.  
 
Regulatory gaps can thus be perceived especially when it comes to new and 
up-and-coming activities in the Arctic. Another issue is the fact that not all 
Arctic states are parties to all relevant conventions protecting the Arctic 
environment. There seems to be an unambiguity regarding which level 
certain cooperation should be conducted at. The legal status of the Arctic 
Council is somewhat unclear, and to a certain extent innocuous. 
Consideration need also be paid to the fact that the Arctic could – although 
this in no way is certain – be subject to more confrontation between 
surrounding states, all depending on economic and security interests and 
developments.  
 
Even if there are major differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic, the 
Arctic could find inspiration within the Antarctic Treaty when creating 
further legal instruments. Given the enormous interest in the Arctic shown 
by outside states it is important that the region is thoroughly regulated, so 
that it will be easier to face the possibilities and challenges of the future. In 
some regards, the Arctic states have shown aversion to developing a 
comprehensive legal instrument, why a first step towards a solution could be 
an instrument that geographically solely covers the Arctic areas not under 
any claim of national jurisdiction and only regulates issues of peculiar 
interest to the Arctic region.  
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Sammanfattning 
Det huvudsakliga syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om ett fullgott 
juridiskt ramverk i syfte att skydda den arktiska regionen redan är etablerat, 
eller om ytterligare juridiska instrument behöver tillkomma för att så ska 
vara fallet. Frågan diskuteras med bakgrund av det faktum att den arktiska 
isen smälter i en hög takt, och att framtiden för regionen sannolikt kommer 
att se väldigt annorlunda ut än vad som hittills har varit fallet. Under flera 
årtionden, eller till och med århundraden, var den allmänna uppfattningen 
att Arktis fortsättningsvis skulle vara täckt av permanent packis, varför 
också utsikterna för någon kommersiell utveckling i regionen var små. Utan 
kommersiell utveckling framträdde heller inget tydligt behov att fundera 
över eventuella kompletterande juridiska åtgärder gällande en sådan. Under 
de senaste 40 åren har klimatförändringarna dock visat prov på att Arktis de 
facto smälter, samt att denna avsmältning kommer att fortsätta. Detta 
kommer att medföra enorma konsekvenser för såväl den arktiska som den 
internationella miljön: Djurlivet kommer att behöva anpassa sig till ett helt 
nytt levnadssätt, och havsnivån kommer att öka för att ge upphov till en helt 
ny kartbild – bara för att nämna två. Ett minskat arktiskt istäcke kommer 
också att innebära positiva konsekvenser. Transpolar sjöfart kommer att 
kunna genomföras säkrare och i större omfattning, fossila bränslen och 
andra naturresurser kommer att vara lättare att utvinna ur havsbotten, och 
även kommersiell aktivitet såsom fiske och turism kommer att kunna 
utvecklas och förvandla Arktis till en blomstrande ekonomi. Just därför kan 
det finnas ett behov av att analysera det gällande juridiska regelverket för 
Arktis, och utveckla sådana instrument som idag fattas och som skulle 
möjliggöra en hållbar utveckling av regionen, vari skydd för den speciella 
miljön inte får stå tillbaka till förmån för så stor ekonomisk vinning som 
möjligt.  
 
Merparten av den arktiska regionen är redan under nationell jurisdiktion, 
men det finns också gemensamma områden (res communis) som inte kan 
åberopas av någon enskild stat. Det finns inget omfattande fördrag som 
reglerar regionen, såsom är fallet vid ”motpolen” – Antarktis. De 
multilaterala eller internationella juridiska instrument som gäller för Arktis 
är bland andra: Förenta Nationernas Havsrättskonvention (UNCLOS), som 
reglerar havet i stort, och innehåller föreskrifter gällande avgränsningen av 
maritima zoner för olika stater och skydd för den marina miljön. Samt 
Konventionen för förhindrande av förorening från fartyg (MARPOL), som 
fokuserar på att begränsa eller förbjuda att olja och liknande skadliga 
substanser släpps ut från fartyg till havet. Extra skydd erbjuds så kallade 
speciella områden (special areas). Inget sådant finns för nuvarande i Arktis.  
 
Eftersom att det har förutspåtts att Arktis havsbotten innehåller stora 
mängder fossila bränslen är de arktiska kuststaterna angelägna om att skaffa 
sig den juridiska rätten att utvinna dessa, vilket görs genom att etablera en 
förlängd kontinentalsockel. Detta sker genom samarbete med FN:s 
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kommission för avgränsning av kontinentalsockeln, hos vilka processen tar 
mycket lång tid. Hittills har bara ett fåtal rekommendationer utfärdats för att 
klargöra möjliga förlängningar av kontinentalsocklar i regionen.  
 
Ett isfritt Arktis betyder mer tillgängliga rutter för sjötransport, som 
kommer att vara betydligt kortare än dagens vid transkontinentala resor. 
Arktis speciella karaktär och avlägsna placering ställer dock särskilt höga 
krav på skeppskonstruktion och besättningens kapacitet. Sjöfart och 
fartygshänförliga föroreningar regleras genom ett antal internationella 
organisationer och instrument, men också på en nationell nivå. Regionalt 
har Arktiska rådet nyligen tagit fram två juridiskt bindande instrument 
gällande sök- och räddningsoperationer till sjös och förhindrande och 
bekämpning av oljeutsläpp. Inom Internationella Sjöfartsorganisationen 
arbetar man för nuvarande med att skapa en bindande Polar-kod rörande 
arktisk sjöfart.  
 
I de nordiska länderna kan det urskiljas en vilja att utveckla Arktiska rådet 
från ett besluts-formande till en besluts-fattande forum, samt att bredda 
föremålet för samarbete till att innefatta ytterligare frågor. Det finns också 
en strävan mot ytterligare, och särskilt mer detaljerad, juridisk reglering av 
den arktiska regionen. En vilja att intensifiera samarbetet rörande militära 
säkerhetsfrågor kan också märkas.   
 
Luckor i gällande reglering kan uppfattas särskilt gällande aktiviteter som är 
nya eller under utveckling i Arktis. Alla arktiska stater är vidare inte ännu 
parter i samtliga relevanta konventioner som syftar till att skydda regionens 
miljö. Det verkar råda en tvetydighet gällande på vilken nivå som olika 
aspekter av arktiskt samarbete ska utspela sig. Arktiska rådets juridiska 
status är något otydligt, och organisationen i förlängningen något tandlös. 
Det måste också beaktas att Arktis kan – även om detta inte på vis är säkert 
– bli föremål för mellanstatlig konfrontation, beroende på ekonomiska och 
säkerhetsrelaterade intressen och utvecklingar.  
 
Även om det finns stora skillnader mellan Arktis och Antarktis skulle Arktis 
kunna hämta inspiration från Antarktisfördraget vid skapandet av ytterligare 
juridiska instrument. Givet det enorma intresset från övriga stater är det av 
vikt att Arktis blir genomgående juridiskt reglerat, så att man där lättare kan 
möta framtidens möjligheter och utmaningar. De arktiska staterna har i vissa 
fall visat en motvilja mot ett sådant större instrument, varför ett första steg 
mot att nå en lösning skulle kunna vara ett juridiskt instrument som 
geografiskt täcker det Arktis som inte är taget i anspråk såsom tillhörande 
nationell jurisdiktion och behandlar frågor som är av speciell karaktär just 
för den arktiska regionen.  
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Preface 
My interest for the Arctic region arose whilst doing an internship at the 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, more specifically with the Swedish 
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. To partake in international negotiations 
concerning such an intricate and delicate region was most certainly 
rewarding and fruitful, and made me think closely about the legal aspects of 
what can be done, and how it can be done, to govern an area that will be of 
the utmost importance for the future development of the world. The 
awakening of this interest I of course have the people involved with the 
Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council during 2011-2013 to thank for.  
 
It became clear for me from very early on that the special needs of the 
Arctic region call for well thought through responsive measures from the 
surrounding states and the rest of the world. I hope that this thesis can shed 
some light on how the future Arctic could, or better yet should, be governed 
and regulated.   
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of my 
supervisor, professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee, not to mention his useful 
insights and great knowledge of Arctic legal issues.  
 
I would also like to extend a warm and heartfelt thank you to my family and 
friends, for their constant support and encouragement during my years spent 
at the Lund University Faculty of Law.  
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Abbreviations 
AC Arctic Council 
ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
AMAP  Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program 
AMSA Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
APMs Associated protective measures 
ATCM Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
ATS Antarctic Treaty System 
AWPPA Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act 
CAFF Conservation of the Arctic Flora and Fauna  
CDEM Construction, Design, Equipment and Manning 
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf  
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response  
EU European Union 
GAIRAS Generally accepted international rules and standards 
GHG Greenhouse gases 
HNS Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
IAMSAR The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue Manual 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISBA International Seabed Authority 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources 
MARPOL International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships 1973/78 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPA Marine Protected Area 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVAREA IMO Regional navigation areas 
 7 
NGO Non Governmental Organizations 
Nm Nautical Miles 
NORDREG Arctic Canada Traffic System 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OILPOL International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of 
the Sea by Oil 1954 
OPRC International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation 
OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic 
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
PLT (II) Polar Law Textbook (II) 
PP Permanent Participant 
PSI Project Support Instrument 
PSSA Particular Sensitive Sea Area 
SAO Senior Arctic Official 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SLCF Short-live Climate Forcers 
SOLAS International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UN Unites Nations 
UNCLOS 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme 
US/USA The United States of America 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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1 Introduction  
The first pages of this thesis will serve to provide the reader with an 
overview of what is to be expected throughout the remaining chapters. A 
purpose section presents the focus of discussion: Is there a need for 
additional legal instruments in order to accommodate a future more 
accessible Arctic region? The Arctic region is delimited to include all eight 
states partaking in the Arctic Council, and the discussion is delimitated to 
make room for an advanced analysis on a few particular issues. 
1.1 Purpose 
The primary object of this thesis consists of examining and analyzing the 
legal framework for the future of the Arctic region. This future could of 
course mean a multiple of different things, and thus a need to look at a 
variety of legal aspects is looming. To give a preface to what legal questions 
can arise, the following illustration can be made. The average temperature 
has increased twice as fast in the Arctic as in the rest of the world. The most 
obvious result of this is the rapidly disappearing sea ice cover. Last year, 
2012, the world witnessed the lowest summer sea ice extent recorded since 
1979, when satellite measurements began.1 The Arctic will soon no longer 
be an ice-covered and vast continent, it will be a main focus for shipping, 
exploitation of natural resources and tourism. It is not at all a farfetched 
thought that the Arctic will be of the utmost commercial importance within 
the foreseeable future.  
 
The specific geographical features of the region, in containing the shortest 
travel and shipping routes between America and Eurasia, make it rather 
likely that the use of the Arctic from a transport perspective will continue to 
evolve. Increased shipping will mean regular all-year shipping of 
merchandise and materials in an area that before has had approximately 5-
10 scientific research vessels passing through each year. This will engender 
a need for pollution regulations, a clear plan for who will save whom, where 
and how, and a division of the responsibility to build harbors for re-fueling 
and repairing. The amount of fishing is also likely to expand, and if so were 
to happen one can spot issues such as who will regulate the legal issues of 
what will be allowed to be fished and where. Decisions have to be taken on 
whether fishing should be an industry to expand or should the fish in the 
Arctic Ocean be protected from such exploitation. It must further be ensured 
that the fishing industry does not cause irreparable harm to the Arctic 
ecosystem and its habitants. It is also likely that the so far undiscovered 
natural (hydrocarbon) resources in the Arctic Ocean seabed will lead to 
increased offshore drilling activities. These would in turn also need heavy 
regulation and a supervisory body would need to monitor and ensure that 
such regulations are obeyed. It needs to be perfectly clear who holds the 
                                                
1 Koivurova, PLT II, p. 68. 
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responsibility to clean up where and how. This list of possible new 
developments in the Arctic could go on at length, and mention aspects such 
as the human dimension, wildlife protection and biodiversity as well, and 
the reader should be aware of these many dimensions of the Arctic future.  
 
Given that the Arctic is a region, though primarily delimited by national 
jurisdictions, to a certain extent under “sovereignty investigations” or 
belonging to no one2, there is an uncertainty regarding who has the right or 
obligation to do one thing or the other. That the Arctic is changing is beyond 
any doubt – the ice is rapidly melting and creating a new geographical 
setting with new possibilities and challenges. In order to benefit and cope 
with this the legal framework of the Arctic needs to be clear and 
unambiguous. If this is already the case or if further actions need to be taken 
will thus be the object of discussion throughout this thesis. Focus will be on 
comprehensive international legislation, as opposed to purely national such. 
In a best-case scenario, the latter could suffice to govern the Arctic (since 
most of the region is under national control). Although – if one is to 
consider that the continent most likely is, and to an even greater extent will 
be, used for international shipping, research, commerce and tourism, 
broader and more trans-boundary instruments (e.g. multilateral agreements) 
would be preferred, paving the way for consistency and clarity throughout 
the Arctic region.  
 
The issues that will be dealt with are specifically as follows: 
• With the development of the Arctic region into a more or less ice-
free and navigable ocean where natural resources exploitation and 
shipping can be carried out in a greater extent than today – is the 
legal capacity for this to function well in place? 
• If there is a need for additional legal instruments or governing 
structures, what would be the best way to construct those?    
 
1.2 Delimitation 
1.2.1 Subjects for Discussion 
The Arctic is one of the seven continents, and to try to cover all legal issues 
that can arise within such a large area (physically as well as regulatory) is of 
course not possible; especially not within the scope of this graduate thesis. 
Some crucial issues have been excluded from this exposition, in order to 
keep focus and make in depth analyses on a smaller amount of, and perhaps 
more pressing, issues. The following areas mentioned are ones the author 
would have wished to develop, and they are listed to shed some light over 
vital issues in the Arctic region, and to illustrate the great effect that the 
Arctic has on the world and vice versa.   
                                                
2 As will be described in chapter 2 – much of the Arctic Ocean is categorized as high seas, 
belonging to the common heritage of mankind, and some of the soils within prospective 
continental shelves are unclear in regards to sovereignty.  
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It may be a well-known fact that the indigenous peoples of the Arctic live 
their lives in a remote area of the world, and that their civilization is unlike 
any other. There is a great need for respect and consideration for, as well as 
continuous cooperation with, the indigenous peoples, and the outside world 
has a responsibility for their prosperity and wellbeing. This being said, the 
rights of indigenous peoples is not further discussed within this thesis.  
 
Apart from being mentioned as a potential legal issue to consider in the 
above purpose section, the fishing industry will not be further debated. 
Arctic fishing is a very political issue, hence the discussion might turn 
political and focus would be pulled out from real underlying legal issues.3 
 
Another issue of great importance is the Arctic environment, and how 
existing ecosystems can be saved and continue even with the melting of ice, 
heightened sea level and increased temperature. Legal aspects here would be 
dividing obligations between states, conducting thorough Environmental 
Impact Assessments and applying hunting restrictions – to name a few. The 
environment will not be fully treated as a separate section in this thesis, but 
will be incorporated in the chapters below. This approach is the reason why 
wildlife protection and other important aspects of the environment will not 
be discussed.  
 
1.2.2 Definition of the Arctic Region 
Sadly for the clarity of this thesis, there is no generally acknowledged 
definition of the Arctic – neither geographically nor in international law. 
The problem is where to draw the southern border.4 Sometimes, the treeline 
is used to make this definition. We also have the 10°C July isotherm – 
where the July average temperature is below ten degrees Celsius the Arctic 
begins. Both these definitions leave out most of Scandinavia, because of the 
Gulf Stream and it’s warming effect on this area. Professor Pharand made 
the suggestion that the Arctic Region could include all areas north of 60° 
North Latitude. This would be a rather liberal approach, and would include 
countries such as the UK. The leading forum on Arctic Cooperation today 
(the Arctic Council) chose to define the Arctic using the Arctic Circle 
criterion, where the southern boundary roughly correlates with the midnight 
sun.5 If this is the delimitation used for the leading Arctic cooperation body 
today, it may serve well as the definition of the Arctic region used 
throughout this thesis as well. 
                                                
3 See for example Ebinger & Zambetakis. Fish cannot recognize national boundaries, are of 
the outmost economic importance and vital for the indigenous peoples survival. Such 
aspects thus make fishing industry management a highly political issue.  
4 Timtchenko, p. 44. 
5 Koivurova, p. 25-28.  
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1.3 Method and Material 
The jurisprudential method includes using sources such as legal instruments 
including legislation in force, applying and analyzing different facts relating 
to such regulations, using a comparative method and taking into account 
other sciences such as economics and philosophy to widen the discussion 
(being careful to thoroughly integrate these aspects with the purely judicial 
ones).6 This is the method used for producing this thesis, which is a 
descriptive study of de lege lata and an analytical presentation of de lege 
ferenda.7 The ambition has been to use a qualitative, as opposed to a 
quantitative, approach when processing available sources, which hopefully 
has led to a high quality end product.8   
 
Thoughts on the Arctic and its future are developed in the different Arctic 
states as well as other states with scientific or economic interests in the 
Arctic, but also in international organizations such as the EU. The ambition 
has been to present the views from these different sources of opinion, to 
make way for the analysis of what would be the best and most suitable way 
to build the legal framework for the future Arctic region. It should be clear 
that international law can be produced and shaped in many informal ways, 
for instance through diplomatic negotiations within the cooperative forum 
the Arctic Council. Even if the legal products developed there or in similar 
formations might only be considered legally non-binding soft law they can 
have a large impact on the future of international law.9  
 
Since this thesis holds a comparative part, the methodological approaches 
for that study needs to be mentioned as well. The author has used a 
comparative method, and in a rational way studied the different national 
views in order to compare them.10 The comparative sections will hopefully 
serve the purpose of not locking the discussion into typically national legal 
solutions and models, but to look at the ideas spreading and prospering in 
the rest of the (concerned) world as well. To keep a broad perspective might 
be the only way to reach the best possible solution. This being said, it is also 
necessary to study foreign legal doctrine whilst using a pair of critical 
glasses, and to know that what is suitable in one state might be completely 
absurd in another. The society and the legal traditions of any state will set 
the framework for how the law is constructed there, so naturally it would be 
nearly impossible to simply “copy/paste” an existing legal regime into the 
Arctic.  
 
A separate chapter has been dedicated to the Nordic Perspective of Arctic 
development. This is not because the best suggestions or views on this 
necessarily are Nordic ones, neither is it a strive to put the Nordic views 
                                                
6 Sandgren, p. 36-39, 41.  
7 Bogdan, p. 23-24.  
8 Sandgren, p. 36-39, 41.  
9 Sandgren, p. 50-51.  
10 Bogdan, p. 23-24.  
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above any other. The Nordic states have, judicially speaking, much in 
common, and is of specific relevance and knowledge to the author as well as 
perhaps potential readers of this thesis, why it seemed appropriate to include 
a more analytical section describing the Nordic perspective on Arctic issues.  
 
There are many publications written on the issue of legal aspects of the 
Arctic region, especially since the 1970’s. As will be described further on, 
this is when the region became a focal point for military investments and 
when climate change started melting the Arctic ice at a rapid pace. During 
the last 20 years Arctic cooperation has intensified, not least through the 
creation of the Arctic Council, while climate change has increased as a 
threat to the global environment. This has brought with it even more 
literature on the subject. For one wanting a deeper knowledge of Arctic 
legal issues, there is a lot to take in. This thesis could be used in such 
studies, as a guide to legal measures that have been taken (primarily) in the 
fields of Arctic shipping, natural resources exploitation and frameworks for 
regional cooperation, and as a prognosis of what might be written on the 
subject in the near future.  
1.4 Structure 
To introduce the reader to the Arctic and the legal issues that may face this 
region in the years to come, chapter two will offer a general overview of the 
concerned aspects of international law and the concept of maritime zonal 
delimitation. After this, focus will be narrowed and peculiar issues relating 
to the Arctic will be described and discussed. Subjects within this section 
include science, arisen and potential legal issues and the established regional 
cooperation governing the Arctic. After this rather thorough presentation the 
Nordic perspective will be portrayed. What are the interests especially 
governed by the Nordic states, and how do “we” view the regulation and 
future of the Arctic region? Chapter five will then go on to focus on 
producing and presenting answers to the two questions pointed out in the 
purpose section, and analyze the different views on how the Arctic future 
could best be governed. To sum up, the last chapter will offer the 
conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis. On the last pages of the 
thesis two maps depicting Arctic shipping routes and jurisdiction and 
boundaries in the region have been included as supplements, to provide a 
more graphic view on these matters.  
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2 A General Arctic Overview 
This chapter focuses on the different aspects of international law that are 
especially applicable to the Arctic. Because of the Arctic geography 
emphasis is on the Law of the Sea. The jurisdictional issues dealt with 
concern delimitation of the Sea primarily according to the rules on 
Continental Shelves as expressed in UNCLOS.   
2.1 Relevant Aspects of International Law 
2.1.1 Res communis-areas 
It is possible for states to have exclusive, although limited, powers of 
jurisdiction over areas outside their own territory. Jurisdiction over such 
“outside areas” can be shared by a multiple of states, or purely by those with 
an interest recognized by the world. The jurisdiction may very well be under 
restriction with reference to the rights of other states concerning the area in 
question. It is important to point out that the jurisdiction herein referred to 
does not imply the same rights as within the territory of a state, but certain 
jurisdictional rights nevertheless. Spaces outside the maritime zones of any 
state may be completely out of sovereign control, and is in that case said to 
be res communis (communal). Such areas are not free for acquisition by any 
state. They must instead, perhaps, be used for “the common heritage of 
mankind”.11 Res communis areas exist in the vicinity of both poles.  
 
The Antarctic 
The southern polar region, the Antarctic, consists partly of permanent and 
temporary sea ice, and partly, and more importantly, of a frozen land mass. 
Within this land mass it is fairly certain that one will find valuable reserves 
of natural resources – such as coal, oil, gas and metals. Exploitation of these 
resources could be undertaken on the basis of state sovereignty, but certain 
states argue that the entire international community should be allowed to 
share in the wealth that possibly lies hidden beneath the Antarctic ice and 
that the area should thus be a part of the common heritage of mankind. In 
whatever way the Antarctic would be “used”, this had to be done under 
regulation of “a comprehensive and effective system of international 
controls”, to ensure the survival and prosperity of the sensitive environment. 
These arguments led to an international regime governing the Antarctic – 
the Antarctic Treaty12. Being signed in 1959 the treaty recognized the great 
importance of keeping the Antarctic environment intact and set out that the 
area must be used solely for peaceful purposes.13 It concluded that “no acts 
or activities taking place while the treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
                                                
11 Dixon, p. 175. Areas falling under the category res communis are the Deep Sea Bed and 
the High Seas.  
12 The Antarctic Treaty, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, p. 72, No. 5778.  
13 Dixon, p. 176-177 (quote p. 176).  
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for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights in Antarctica” (Art. 4) – meaning no claims 
of sovereignty were longer allowed. The Antarctic Treaty has 50 parties, 
including 28 “Consultative Parties” who gather every second year to make 
Recommendations in the auspices of the treaty. In 1991, the Consultative 
Parties agreed upon a Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty14, which turned the South Pole into a free zone where all mining and 
exploitation activities would be prohibited. This protocol will be in force for 
50 years, and thereafter be the object of re-negotiation.15   
 
The Arctic  
Looking north at the Arctic, it is (unlike the Antarctic) to a large extent 
consisting of mainly frozen sea ice (permanent pack-ice). Regardless of, 
parts of the Arctic ice are under sovereignty claims from states such as 
Russia and Canada. These claims have generated resistance by other states 
in turn claiming that the Arctic should fall under the same legal definition as 
the high seas. Given this, the legal status of the Arctic today is somewhat 
unclear. Also unlike Antarctic, there is no treaty regime governing the 
Arctic. This is undoubtedly “a reflection of the fact that the prospect of 
valuable mineral resources being found in the Arctic is remote, although it is 
of considerable military importance”.16 Even if there is no over-arching 
international legal instrument, multiple global/regional/bilateral conventions 
are in force to govern the Arctic region.17 
2.1.2 The Law of the Sea 
2.1.2.1 Sources of Law 
What has come to be known as the Law of the Sea in international law 
covers matters of state sovereignty and jurisdiction and rights over water, 
the sea bed, its subsoil and the airspace above the sea. This is an important 
field of law since the sea is used for vital interests such as international trade 
and transportation as well as exploitation of natural resources such as fish, 
oil and gas and minerals. A vast legal framework governing the sea has been 
constructed by the United Nations, and is known as the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention18 (UNCLOS). Apart from this multilateral treaty, the Law of the 
Sea largely consists of customary law, bilateral as well as multilateral.19 
                                                
14 30 International Legal Materials 1455 (1991), available at 
http://www.ats.aq/documents/recatt%5Catt006_e.pdf 
15 Dixon, p. 177.  
16 Dixon, p. 178 (incl. quote).  
17 Timtchenko, p. xiii-xiv. Examples of conventions in force are: The 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the regional 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, 
and the bilateral 1988 US – Canada Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, 1988 Soviet-
Norwegian Agreement on Polar Studies, 1992 Russian-Canadian Agreement concerning the 
Arctic and the North. 
18 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, United Nations Treaty Series 
Vol. 1833, No. 31363, p. 397, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
19 Dixon, p. 217.  
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UNCLOS is generally applicable, meaning it is not confined to any certain 
parts of the sea. If any particular issue is not regulated within UNCLOS, or 
if a state is not party to UNCLOS (such as USA – the only one of the five 
Arctic Coastal states choosing to remain outside the Convention20) the four 
multilateral Geneva Conventions from 1958 is the second source of law.21 
The third choice, if dealing with states not even parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, is customary international law – which recent case law has 
confirmed that large parts of UNCLOS have codified.22 This is the case for 
concepts such as Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
taken directly from UNCLOS, which thus have been deemed to exist in the 
international customary law.23 Besides UNCLOS, there are special 
conventions to govern specific issues. Of importance for this thesis is 
particularly agreements such as the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and Protocol 1978 (MARPOL).24 
 
2.1.2.2 Zones of the Sea 
Territorial Sea 
Art. 1 of the Territorial Sea Convention 195825 as well as Art. 2 of 
UNCLOS define the Territorial Sea as a belt of sea adjacent to the coast of a 
state. Apart from the land territory, the particular state will have sovereignty 
also over this sea area, its airspace and subsoil. The sovereignty includes 
full legislative jurisdiction, although it is stipulated that a coastal state 
should not, under normal circumstances, exercise any criminal jurisdiction 
over foreign vessels or stop/divert them by using any civil jurisdiction 
(UNCLOS, Art. 27-28). UNCLOS Art. 17 also grants the right of innocent 
passage26 for all ships passing through a Territorial Sea, a right that is “non-
suspendable through straits used for international navigation” (UNCLOS 
Art. 45, Corfu Channel Case 1949 ICJ).27 The Territorial Sea may not 
exceed 12 nautical miles (nm28) in width (UNCLOS Art. 3) from the low-
water mark of the coast extending straight out into the sea. The principle of 
a maximum 12 nm territorial sea can be said to be customary international 
                                                
20 McDorman, p. 159. USA recognizes most UNCLOS provisions as Customary Law, but 
did not support Part XI on dispute settlement, and to prevent being bound to this section 
chose to not be a party of UNCLOS at all. The USA National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region (May 10, 2013), p.2, states that USA will work toward an accession to the 
Convention. See also Koivurova & Molenaar, p. 38.  
21 Dixon, p. 218. The four conventions being: The 1958 Geneva Conventions on The 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, on The Continental Shelf, on The High Seas and on 
The Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.  
22 Dixon, p. 218: Case Concerning Maritime and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain 2001 ICJ, Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration 1999.  
23 Dixon, p. 219.  
24 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 1148, No. 18961, p. 2 (SOLAS) and Volume 
1340, No. 22484, p. 61 (MARPOL Protocol 1987).  
25 United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 516, No. 7477, p. 205.  
26 For more on the term ”innocent passage”, see UNCLOS Art. 19.  
27 See Dixon, p. 220-221.  
28 One nautical mile, 1 nm, equals 6,080 feet or 1,852 meters (OILPOL Art. 1).  
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law, even if such a conclusion is not absolutely certain.29 If the mentioned 
technique of drawing Territorial Sea borders is complicated due to a 
severely broken coastline the more practical method of using straight 
baselines is an option. These are straight lines drawn between certain points 
of the coastline, which give a base from where to draw the 12 nm border 
more easily. UNCLOS Art. 7 gives a thorough description of what is 
acceptable for a state when drawing a straight baseline (as to not include too 
much out of greed for further sovereign jurisdiction).30  
 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
Where the Territorial Sea ends, the EEZ begins. This belt of sea extends up 
to 200 nm from the same baselines used to measure the width of the 
Territorial Sea. Within the EEZ, which does not naturally belong to a state 
but has to be claimed, a state has sovereign rights to explore and exploit 
what living and non-living natural resources that may exist. The coastal 
state is thus the only state enjoying the right to fish and drill for oil within 
its EEZ.31 These exploitation rights are the only ones in force though, and 
the coastal state cannot interfere with any commercial activities by other 
states taking place in the EEZ unless those would directly challenge the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state. The use of the EEZ by its coastal state 
is under scrutiny by the international community, and under regulation by 
UNCLOS.32 Other states still enjoy the freedom to navigate, fly over, lay 
down submarine cables and use the sea of the EEZ in other internationally 
lawful ways whilst respecting the coastal state’s exclusive rights as 
mentioned above (UNCLOS Art. 58).33  
 
If two coastal states have competing claims for their EEZ’s, the most 
frequently used solution is to draw a maritime boundary based on the 
principles of equidistance and equity for both the Territorial Sea and the 
EEZ for each state.34  
 
The Continental Shelf 
UNCLOS Art. 77 declares that a state does not have to claim its Continental 
Shelf, since it is an extension of its continental landmass. The state has 
sovereign rights over this area, for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
the natural resources found at the floor of the ocean. The water above the 
shelf though, is still considered high seas (UNCLOS Art. 78).35 The legal 
basis for the authority of a coastal state over a Continental Shelf is 
adjacency. With the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases came the 
                                                
29 Dixon, p. 222. It is the UK view that the 12 nm Territorial Sea is a customary law 
principle, although a handful of states have claimed that their Territorial Sea is in fact 
wider.  
30 Dixon, p. 222-223. Moreover, between opposite and adjacent coastal states, the territorial 
sea delimitation is done by using the equidistance-median rule – the border will thus be 
”the median line which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines of the” states.  
31 Dixon, p. 225-226.  
32 Dixon, p. 226.  
33 Dixon, p. 226.  
34 Dixon, p. 226-227.  
35 Dixon, p. 228, 235. 
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introduction of the term natural prolongation, meaning that a coastal state 
has rights over “the area of [the] continental shelf that constitut[es] a natural 
prolongation of its land territory.” This has turned out to be the primary 
legal basis for jurisdictional authority over the Continental Shelf. The 
principle was adopted in UNCLOS Art. 76(1).36 Through its Continental 
Shelf regulations, UNCLOS to a large extent reflects both the geopolitical 
and the economic importance of coastal states being able to control offshore 
hydrocarbon exploitation in their coastal seafloor beds.37  It can be debated 
whether or not the natural prolongation-rule will fall under customary 
international law, although it is apparent that only a small number of 
concerned states will have a dissenting opinion regarding this (perhaps 
solely the USA).38 
 
It should be noted that the physical (geomorphological) limit of the 
Continental Shelf does not necessarily correspond with the legal one. Legal 
limits here being the primary concern, these are the ones that will be 
presented.39  
 
UNCLOS Art. 76 states that: All states have a legal continental shelf up to 
200 nm from the baselines used to map the territorial sea. This is regardless 
of how the shelf is actually configured. If the actual shelf extends beyond 
these 200 nm the state’s legal shelf will be constructed by the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to where the continental margin has its 
outer edge. The shelf cannot exceed 350 nm from the baselines used, or 100 
nm from the 2,500 meter isobath (the “line of equal depth”). This is the 
seaward maximum limit.40  
 
To obtain a maximum legal Continental Shelf, one has to determine the foot 
of the continental slope, and use this to draw a line connecting the points 
farthest away, where the sedimentary rocks are at least as thick as 1% of the 
shortest distance from one of these points to the continental foot slope, or, 
draw a line connecting such abovementioned points no further out than 60 
nm from the continental slope foot.41 The criteria used to draw the outer 
limits of an extended Continental Shelf are “not easily applicable in any 
given situation because of the technical and definitional difficulties of 
determining the thickness of the sedimentary rocks, the foot of the 
continental slope, the 2,500 metre isobaths, and distinguishing among 
submarine ridges, oceanic ridges, and submarine elevations that are natural 
components of the continental margin”42. The existence of hydrocarbon 
resources clearly plays a role here, since the sediment thickness criteria 
ensures secured jurisdiction over all such resources that possibly will exist 
in the offshore areas adjacent to the coast. The thought was that if sediments 
                                                
36 McDorman, p. 163 (incl. quote).  
37 McDorman, p. 163.  
38 Dixon, p. 230.  
39 Dixon, p. 229.  
40 UNCLOS Art. 76 & Dixon, p. 229. The 2,500 meter isobaths is a line connecting the 
depth of 2,500 meters.       
41 McDorman, p. 168.  
42 McDorman, p. 169.  
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were thick enough to hold hydrocarbon, they should belong to the coastal 
state in question. This might be of economic advantage for some states and 
not point out the most natural and logic boundary, a criticism the rule has 
endured.43  
 
If a state can claim shelf rights beyond 200 nm that would mean a 
derogation from the principle of common heritage otherwise applicable to 
the deep sea bed. Because of this, a coastal state exploiting resources within 
this prolongation of Continental Shelf is obliged to make payments to the 
International Sea Bed Authority (ISBA), who will distribute this to other 
states (UNCLOS Art. 82).44  
 
For dealing with competing claims and other matters of uncertainty the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) was established 
under UNCLOS. CLCS is concerned with the various aspects of shelf-
delimitation exceeding the 200 nm-limit and receives submissions from 
coastal states on how their shelf beyond the 200 nm should be delimited.45 If 
two states have competing claims, there are a few ways of solving the issue 
(as demonstrated by the ICJ): The Convention of the Continental Shelf 
(1958) stated that delimitation was to be made using “a median line 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines of the territorial sea of 
each state, subject only to variations for special circumstances” – the 
equidistance-special circumstance rule.46 Apart from this rule, it has later 
been said that the shelf should be divided based on natural prolongation, if 
this would mean achieving a more equitable result.47 Such a result was 
namely the purpose of the equidistance-special circumstance rule to begin 
with.48 The need for special attention to the circumstances in each case is 
thus strong.49 An important factor in delimiting Continental Shelves where 
competing claims exist has been to look at the proportionality of the 
situation – if state A has a much longer coastline than competing state B, 
state B may get a wider shelf to “compensate”.50 Most recent case law51 has 
shown that a judgment made with reference to the principles above can be 
done using three steps: Draw an equidistance line following real geography, 
adjust it for special circumstances, check that the result is not 
disproportionate. This will lead to a result compatible with UNCLOS and 
(most likely) accepted as customary law.52  
 
 
                                                
43 McDorman, p. 170.  
44 Dixon, p. 230. 
45 Dixon, p. 230.  
46 Dixon, p. 231 (incl. quote).  
47 An equitable result is the only demand set for delimitation by UNCLOS, Art. 83.  
48 Dixon, p. 231 – according to ICJ decisions from 1979 and 1993.  
49 Dixon, p. 232.  
50 Dixon, p. 232.  
51 See for example the Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) Case 
(2009) and the Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, (Bangladesh/Myanmar) (2012). 
52 Dixon, p. 234. The process is also thoroughly described by McDorman, see p. 175.  
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The Deep Sea Bed    
One can be rather certain that it is a matter of customary law that the sea-
bed and it’s subsoil, beyond any limits for national jurisdiction, is the 
common heritage of mankind, and it shall thus be used to benefit mankind as 
a whole. Here, all “mineral activities should be governed by an international 
regime and […] the area should be used for peaceful purposes only”.53 This 
is also stated in UNCLOS Art. 136-137. The International Sea Bed 
Authority oversees the Deep Sea Bed,54 and can grant states the right to 
conduct mining in therein. This comes at the price of a levy and an amount 
proportional to the market value of extracted minerals, and will be 
distributed equitable to the parties of the treaty (UNCLOS Art. 140).55 The 
UNCLOS Part governing the Deep Sea Bed was somewhat controversial, 
and its entry into force prompted an additional Agreement (in 1994), giving 
extended protection for the rights and profits of states that actually do 
conduct mining activity in these areas.56  
 
The High Seas 
Customary law and UNCLOS Art. 86 define the High Seas as all parts of 
the sea excluding internal waters, Territorial Sea, EEZ’s and archipelagic 
water belonging to an archipelagic state. Generally the High Seas are res 
communis, and can be enjoyed by any state (through the freedoms to fish, 
navigate, lay submarine cables, research etc.) while no state can claim 
sovereignty over any area belonging to the High Seas (UNCLOS Art. 220). 
The High Seas shall only be used for peaceful purposes and with due regard 
to the rights of other states and the rules governing the Deep Sea Bed. 
Military exercises and weapon testing are allowed (so long as they are not 
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons).57   
 
International Straits 
One can pass through a navigable channel, a strait, without any 
complication when the strait in question is located within the High Seas – 
this is purely exercising the freedom of navigation. If the strait however lies 
in the Territorial Sea or other maritime zone of a coastal state, problems 
could likely arise.58 The ICJ has earlier deemed an international navigational 
strait comprised of Territorial Sea to be subject to a constant right of 
innocent passage for all ships going through the strait.59 Today, this might 
be an exaggeration. UNCLOS introduced the term transit passage, and the 
right for such exists through straits being at least partly comprised of 
Territorial Sea and used for international navigation between an area of the 
High Seas/an EEZ and another area of the High Seas/an EEZ. This new way 
of [transit] passage, is currently not a part of customary law.60  
 
                                                
53 Dixon, p. 237 (incl. quote). 
54 Dixon, p. 238.  
55 Dixon, p. 239.  
56 Dixon, p. 239-240.  
57 Dixon, p. 241. 
58 Dixon, p. 242.  
59 Dixon, p. 242.  
60 UNCLOS Art. 37-44 & Dixon, p. 243.  
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2.1.3 Protecting the Marine Environment 
UNCLOS includes rules giving primacy to the flag slate to enact legislation 
and enforce measures for controlling pollution against vessels of their 
nationality, as well as providing for coastal state jurisdiction on areas of 
pollution control and management. International law already includes 
general obligations in order to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment, and prevent pollution from ships as well as dumping of any 
radioactive waste.61 Multiple conventions and customary rules further 
control the protection of the seas, such as: the International Convention for 
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 (OILPOL)62, the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 
and Protocol 1978 (MARPOL) and the International Convention Relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969 
(INTERVENTION)63. What the international community can hope for, is 
that UNCLOS will mean an “ensuring of a more enforceable code for the 
protection of the marine environment” 64. 
 
To briefly highlight MARPOL, it can be said that the convention came to be 
as a result of a common concern for the serious pollution being caused by 
the release of oil and alike harmful substances from ships, and a desire to 
eliminate such pollution.65 The methods prescribed within the Protocol 
include surveying large oil tankers and ships to detect any flaws in 
equipment or systems and a certificate arrangement ensuring that surveyed 
vessels comply with the demands in the convention (Regulation 4). Annex I, 
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil, Regulation 9, further 
(naturally) prohibits discharge of oil/oily mixtures from a ship into the sea, 
the prohibition under a number of preconditions and with various 
exceptions. Regulation 1 (10) define so called special areas – a sea area that 
because of its oceanographical and ecological condition is in need of special 
mandatory methods for preventing pollution caused by oil. These special 
areas are practically always subject to a total pollution prohibition and are 
under more scrutiny than other areas of the sea (Regulations 10-11).  
 
As a provision granting coastal states special regulatory powers, UNCLOS 
Art. 234 turned out to be somewhat controversial. The article deals with ice-
covered areas and gives special regulatory and enforcement rights to coastal 
states in order to prevent pollution from vessels occurring within a 200 nm-
limit (the EEZ):66  
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
                                                
61 Dixon, p. 245. The sources in law regarding this is the Draft Regulations on the 
Protection of the Environment taking effect under UNCLOS part XII, and the High Seas 
Commission 1958.  
62 United Nations Treaty Series Volume 327, No. 4714, p. 3. Amendments were made in 
1962, 1969 and 1971. OILPOL can be viewed as somewhat of a predecessor to MARPOL.  
63 United Nations Treaty Series Volume 970 No. 14049, p. 211.  
64 Dixon, p. 245-246 (quote, p. 246).  
65 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1340, p. 184. 
66 Timtchenko, p. 124 & UNCLOS Art. 234 (quote following section).  
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pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and 
the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the 
marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance 
of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard 
to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
The Convention unfortunately does not offer any guidance regarding 
whether rules on transit passage (through straits used for international 
navigation) will prevail exceptions made under Art. 234, or if the latter will 
in fact trump the former.67 Neither does there seem to be any clarity on what 
will happen when the Arctic is no longer sufficiently covered with ice, and 
Art. 234 no longer can be used to protect the sensitive environment.68  
 
There is currently no area in the Arctic Ocean designated as a special area 
under MARPOL. This means that pollution discharge standards can be (and 
in fact is) less strict for Arctic areas than Antarctic areas (where such special 
areas have been designated). If coastal states do not impose any stricter 
standards then the globally valid ones, by using the special legislative 
powers given through Art. 234 of UNCLOS, global standards will be the 
ones applicable. Insofar, Canada and Russia have imposed stricter discharge 
standards. Canada allows no oil, garbage or waste discharge from ships in 
the Arctic (this applies with limited exceptions) and Russia has prohibited 
the discharge of oily ballast water and garbage deposit in the Northern Sea 
Route.69 
 
OSPAR 
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, Paris, 22 September 1992 (OSPAR) governs the Atlantic parts 
of the Arctic maritime area, mainly through rules and principles on pollution 
from land-based sources, by dumping or incineration, from offshore sources 
and the assessment of the marine environment quality. Neither Russia, USA 
nor Canada is a party to the OSPAR Convention, although they can 
participate upon invitation from participating states. OSPAR regulates all 
human activities (minus fishing and with restrictions concerning shipping 
regulations) possible to have an adverse affect on North East Atlantic 
ecosystems and biodiversity. Important principles within this work are the 
precautionary principle, polluter pays principle and the use of best available 
techniques/practice. Many of the actions (decisions, guidelines etc) taken 
within OSPAR complement or in some way relate to actions taken within 
other international instruments such as the IMO or MARPOL.70  Through 
Annex V of OSPAR, assessments have been initiated to identify the impacts 
of new and emerging activities in the Arctic, such as construction of 
artificial islands or placement of cables and pipelines. Such assessments 
should function as a basis for decision as to what measures needs to be 
                                                
67 Koivurova & Molenaar, p. 22.  
68 Legal Aspects of Arctic Shipping, p. 12.  
69 Vanderzwaag, PLT, p. 61.  
70 Koivurova & Molenaar, p. 15-17.  
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taken in the near future.71 
 
2.2 Jurisdictional and Zonal Issues in the 
Arctic 
2.2.1 Continental Shelf Investigations 
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) facilitates 
the implementation of UNCLOS and its rules on establishing the outer 
limits of the Continental Shelf when this stretches beyond 200 nm from the 
baselines (as mentioned above). UNCLOS states that a coastal state shall 
establish such outer limits based on the recommendations of CLCS72. The 
recommendations from the commission though, shall not prejudice matters 
related to the delimitation of boundaries between states with coasts opposite 
or adjacent to each other. Bilateral agreements should in this case prevail.73 
In such cases where two states were to have overlapping claims to a 
Continental Shelf area, this issue should be solved through the use of 
international law and political negotiations.74 
 
From the date that UNCLOS comes into force for a state, that state has ten 
years to make a formal submission to the CLCS. This deadline will be 
considered met even if only a partial or preliminary submission can be made 
within the time frame. The Canadian submission should, according to this, 
be done in 2013. Because of its status as a non-party to UNCLOS, USA will 
not face any deadline before it chooses to join the Convention.75 In 
December 2001, Russian decided to submit to the CLCS their “request” for 
extension of the Continental Shelves in the Arctic Ocean.76 The Russian 
claim concerned for instance a wedge-shaped area stretching from the coast 
to the North Pole. The eastern limit of this area is fully based on a 1990 
USA-Russia Agreement. The Russian CLCS proposal of a meridian line 
extends far beyond the place where Russia and USA potentially have 
overlapping claims for continental shelf delimitation and into an area that 
Canada might claim or might even be part of the deep ocean floor.77 
Moreover, many ridges included in the Russian claim seem to be submarine 
ridges, or oceanic ridges – neither which could belong to the coastal state 
adjacent under given circumstances. Russia could try and rationalize their 
claim stretching towards the USA by referring to the sector theory, a theory 
by which offshore jurisdiction could be claimed based on straight lines 
                                                
71 Koivurova & Molenaar, p. 18.  
72 UNCLOS Art. 76(8).  
73 Oceans & Law of the Sea United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm#Purpose 
74 McDorman, p. 161.  
75 Baker, p. 66.  
76 Press Release SEA/1729, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm. 
See map: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/ 
RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_2.jpg.  
77 McDorman, p. 160 &176.  
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projected fro the coast margin to the North Pole (more on the sector theory 
in section 2.2.2). Perhaps the Russian meridian line was a suggestion 
directed at the other Arctic coastal states that the Arctic Ocean Seafloor 
could be sectorally divided using a sector theory take on delimitation.78 The 
US made the objection that the Alpha-Mendelev Ridge was of volcanic 
oceanic origin, and that the Lomonosov Ridge was freestanding in the deep 
oceanic Arctic Ocean Basin, hence none of these could be under Russian 
“control”.79 The CLCS decided as follows: In the case of the Barents and 
Bering seas, the Commission recommended to the Russian Federation, upon 
entry into force of the maritime boundary delimitation agreements with 
Norway in the Barents Sea, and with USA in the Bering Sea, to transmit to 
the Commission the charts and coordinates of the delimitation lines as they 
would represent the outer limits of the continental shelf of the Russian 
Federation extending beyond 200 nautical miles in the Barents Sea and the 
Bering Sea respectively.80 As regards the Central Arctic Ocean, the 
Commission recommended that the Russian Federation make a revised 
submission in respect of its extended continental shelf in that area based on 
the findings contained in the recommendations.81  
 
Five years later, in November 2006, Norway submitted to the CLCS its 
proposal of extended Continental Shelves for three areas in the north: the 
Barents Sea Loop Hole, the Arctic Ocean Western Nansen Basin and the 
Norwegian Sea Banana Hole.82 In March 2009, the CLCS adopted 
recommendations saying that they acknowledge that the information within 
the Norwegian submission regarding the Loop Hole satisfies the 
requirements of a submission to extend the Continental Shelf (in accordance 
with UNCLOS Art. 76). The only issue left was the delineation of the extent 
of Norway’s and Russia’s Continental Shelf in the Loop Hole, which should 
be handled through a bilateral agreement.83 The CLCS also made 
delimitation recommendations concerning the Western Nansen Basin area as 
well as the Banana Hole area (where final outer Continental Shelf limits 
may depend on interstate delimitation).84  
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In April 2009, Denmark (joined by the Government of the Faroe Islands) 
made a submission regarding an area north of the Faroe Islands. The 
submission was only partial, to be completed with submissions regarding 
maritime areas south of the Faroes, but also around the coast of Greenland. 
Until these further submissions have been received, the CLCS will wait on 
making any recommendations.85 So far only one supplementary submission, 
regarding the southern Continental Shelf of the Faroes, has been sent in to 
the CLCS by the Kingdom of Denmark, in December 2010.86 
 
Although no CLCS submission has been made, Canada has drawn up a map 
showing its possible and significant continental margin area exceeding 200 
nm in the Arctic Ocean. Canada agrees with Russia in the sense that they 
see the Alpha-Mendelev and Lomonosov Ridges as possible parts of the 
continental shelf – although the two states have made this observation in 
favor of the own state. The desktop study map Canada has produced makes 
no reference to the previously cherished sector theory as a basis for 
jurisdictional claims in the Arctic Ocean.87  
 
Even if the US is not a party to UNCLOS, its 2009 Policy for the Arctic 
Region states that using the CLCS procedure and following the UNCLOS 
provisions applicable when proposing an extended Continental Shelf will be 
the most effective way of achieving legal certainty and international 
recognition for such a desired larger Shelf area.88 The US has followed the 
Canadian example and produced a map based on a desktop study. The 
primary focus is the Chukchi plateau, which potentially has significant oil 
and gas reserves. A prospective US Chukchi claim could extend quite far 
into the sea, as far as 600 nm from the coast of Alaska.89  
 
In order to successfully claim an extended Continental Shelf, a state needs 
to provide scientific evidence supporting that claim.90 This means acquiring 
scientific data concerning the geological composition as well as other 
physical properties of the area claimed to constitute the Continental Shelf.91  
 
Even if the CLCS is the forum receiving Continental Shelf “extension 
applications”, it is not so that the existence of a state’s extended Continental 
Shelf is dependent on any recognition from the CLCS. The rights of the 
coastal state will exist even if no CLCS submissions have been made – but 
if the case for an extended shelf has not been sufficiently built and 
presented, there will always be a lack of security as to how far out one’s 
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Continental Shelf rights actually go.92 It is even fully expected that any 
Arctic State that is a party to UNCLOS and have not made submissions to 
the Commission (currently meaning Canada), will do so before the deadline 
has passed.93 This being said, the CLCS is in no way a court judging on 
extended Continental Shelves, the coastal state themselves will determine 
the outer limits of their respective shelves. In reality though, the CLCS 
opinion matters a great deal, and states that have submitted an “application” 
to the CLCS will most likely follow the CLCS recommendations.94 The 
CLCS does not however conduct any dispute resolution between states with 
competing claims for Continental Shelf area, in fact, a dispute between two 
states would hinder a CLCS recommendation. States can circumvent this by 
agreeing with potential opponents that the Commissions recommendations 
on areas that might be subject of future disputes will not have any prejudice 
to following bilateral delimitations, by obtaining the consent of such 
states.95 As mentioned, states with opposing claims shall reach an agreement 
to resolve these (UNCLOS Art. 83). Negotiations to achieve a solution will 
likely be very political, although third-party adjudicative tribunals have 
developed somewhat of an international law on maritime boundary 
delimitation.96  
 
Why then are the Arctic Coastal states so concerned with acquiring an 
extended Continental Shelf? This is most certainly a result of indications 
that rather large amounts of hydrocarbon and other energy resources can be 
found in the Arctic Sea Bed, a source of revenue of key interest for the 
states in question.97 Recent reports state that 30% of the world’s 
undiscovered gas and 13% of its undiscovered oil is likely to be found in the 
Arctic region.98 Exploitation of onshore areas within the area above the 
Arctic Circle have already resulted in more than 400 oil and gas fields being 
discovered, which has led to 40 billion barrels of oil, 1100 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas and 8 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of this comes 
from the West Siberian Basin of Russia and the North Slope of Alaska. So 
far, exploratory drilling offshore has only been conducted in a limited 
amount, but has led to the US Geological Survey conclusion that the Arctic 
in fact is one of the more prospective areas globally where it is reasonable to 
expect significant new discoveries.99  
 
In 2008, the estimate was that the “extensive Arctic continental shelves may 
constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for 
petroleum remaining on Earth”.100 The highest probability rate for finding 
natural resources exists within areas of national jurisdiction, and not outside 
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the 200 nm limit.101 Even if this is true, there are and have been some 
Continental Shelf claims of overlapping nature in the Arctic102: Canada and 
the US claims in the Beaufort Sea, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) for 
parts of the Lincoln Sea, Denmark (Greenland)103 and Norway (Spitsbergen) 
for parts of the northern Greenland Sea and Norway (Spitsbergen) and 
Russia in the north parts of the Barents Sea.104 A few disputes have been 
solved through the conclusion of bilateral treaties, namely: The Agreement 
on the Maritime Boundary, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 1, 1990, which is not 
currently in force, and the Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf and the Fisheries Zones in the Area Between Greenland 
and Svalbard, Den./Green.-Nor., Feb. 20, 2006, which only regulates the 
200 nm zone.105 In September 2010, the lengthy negotiations between 
Norway and Russia finally came to an end and resulted in the signing and 
ratification of the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. In November 2012, Canada and Denmark 
reached an important (though tentative) agreement establishing maritime 
boundaries in the Lincoln Sea. After ratification, this agreement will mean a 
modernization of the earlier 1973 agreement between the two states 
concerning the same maritime boundary.106 
 
Given that there seems to be potential for extracting a reasonable amount of 
hydrocarbon from the Arctic Seabed, it is understandable that coastal states 
try to maximize their potential area of gathering such natural resources – 
through the establishment of an extended Continental Shelf. This of course 
would be more favorable than to let resources pass to another state or to the 
ISBA.107 
 
2.2.2 The Sector Theory 
In 1925, Canada made claims of jurisdictional sovereignty all the way to the 
North Pole, based on what came to be known as the Sector Theory. Soon 
Russia (then, the USSR) followed, by 1926 proclaiming that all lands and 
islands which did not belong to any other state at that time and was located 
north of the Russian coast all the way up to the North Pole were to be 
considered USSR territory.108 In practice, meridians of longitude were used 
to claim sovereign territory over areas up to the North Pole.109 The sector 
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theory proved to be somewhat popular, not at least among Americans, and a 
sector-wise dividing of the Arctic between the states closest thereto could 
reasonably be convenient. Thorough analysis has concluded though, that 
bilateral boundary treaties (such as the 1867 Boundary Treaty between the 
USA and Russia, defining limits of territory and dominion for the two states 
– not state boundaries but solely devices for simplifying the cartography110) 
cannot serve as a legal basis for the sector theory, neither has this theory 
become any principle of customary law or has contiguity to serve as legal 
basis for sectorial division. This leaves no legal arguments for applying the 
sector theory in the Arctic.111 In recent years, the sector theory has lost 
ground among Russian legal professionals, who now strive towards 
delimitation through generally accepted principles and international law 
regulations.112 Canada spent the early 20th century claiming that the sector 
theory was “very generally recognized” and that this theory gave them 
sovereignty within “their” sector up to the North Pole. During the 1950’s the 
government clarified that they only had sovereignty claims over actual land 
within their sector.113 Arctic states such as USA, Norway and Denmark have 
in various ways expressed their rejection of the sector theory.114  
 
2.2.3 The Archipelago Theory 
Another way of claiming jurisdiction over waters adjacent to the coast is by 
use of the Archipelago Theory. A state would under this theory claim that 
all waters within the archipelago make out areas of national water, water 
under jurisdiction of the claiming state. This conclusion would be drawn 
without any regard to the breadth of the Territorial Sea.115 To base claims of 
sovereignty on the Archipelago Theory is somewhat risky, given that the 
archipelago may be very broken and stretch over a very vast area. To gain 
acceptance from other concerned states may thus be very difficult. Canada 
had thoughts about claiming sovereignty according to the Archipelago 
Theory, before deciding on the Sector Theory instead, and made the 
archipelago claim part of its “Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act” 
(AWPPA), a legislation to prevent any massive environmental disaster in 
the Canadian Arctic region pointing out that the Arctic waters also largely 
were Canadian.116  
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3 Specific Issues Peculiar to 
the Arctic 
If the previous chapter served to provide the reader with an overview of the 
international law most noticeably associated with the Arctic region and 
issues of delimitation originating from this legal framework, this chapter 
will deal with problems or solutions that have come to be as a result of the 
specific character of the Arctic environment and the region’s distant 
position on the world map. Chapters two and three have a number of points 
in common, why it is important to bear what is stated above in mind when 
continuing the study reflected in this thesis.  
 
3.1 Scientific Aspects 
Throughout the history of the world, the Arctic climate has seen dramatic 
shifts, for a long time simply caused by oceanic and atmospheric variability 
and/or variations in solar intensity. These earlier shifts occurred in cycles, 
long-term or short-term, giving a “balanced” end-result. Since the industrial 
revolution, the Arctic has had to face a less natural climate driver with major 
repercussions: Anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. In fact, 
most of the global (and Arctic) warming seen in the last 50 years can be 
attributed to human activities.117 In the Arctic, the climate changes are 
shown through warmer air temperatures, diminishing extent and duration of 
snow and sea ice and thawing permafrost. The particular sensitivity of the 
region makes is highly likely that human-induced factors such as a rise in 
GHG concentrations will result in very large climate changes in the 
Arctic.118 The climate change has a large effect on the Arctic ecosystem and 
lives. Observations show that the changing environment, and the changes in 
food availability that have followed, has caused nutritional stresses on many 
animals; new species have established themselves, and many already 
existing species have extended their living area much further north.119  
 
The ongoing dramatic melt of the Arctic region is thus directly attributable 
to the industrial emissions of various greenhouse gases. The rays of the sun 
also strike the North Pole area at a much sharper angle than elsewhere 
which contributes greatly to the intensive warming. The melted ice turns 
into open, dark, water, with the possibility to absorb solar radiation to a 
much greater extent than the white and bright ice would do. The fact that the 
region is more exposed to warming caused by sunrays and that the melting 
initially occurring through these sun rays will make the region even more 
susceptible to the warming effect is called the ice-albedo feedback loop.120  
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The continuous warming has meant that much of the multiyear ice is now 
gone, and the Arctic will most likely become a sea solely covered by a thin 
layer of seasonal ice during the winters, and this will mean that shipping can 
be carried out year-round. This scenario is not far away, perhaps only a few 
years or decades.121 What is even more alarming is that the melt will make 
way for extracting more resources of the kind that is behind global warming 
in the first place – fossil fuels. The price of oil is peaking, and geologists are 
eager to discover more resources under the Arctic icecap. Indications are 
that the last remaining undiscovered hydrocarbon resources on earth may be 
hidden at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, and that there might be one 
quarter of the oil and gas deposits yet to be found.122  
 
Another Arctic feedback phenomenon is the permafrost thawing, which 
most probably will lead to additional release of GHG.123 As a result of 
imbalance between the processes of photosynthesis and decomposition, 
carbon has been stored in lake/ocean sediments and in the soils of forest and 
tundra for over thousands of years. This has been possible due to low 
temperatures, which retarded the microbial decomposition more then the 
photosynthesis. The projected increases in temperature can likely lead to 
older as well as more recently captured carbon to be released into the 
atmosphere. Releasing this stored carbon will lead to increased 
concentrations of atmospheric GHG, which will cause harm to the climate 
system. Meanwhile, these increased temperatures also have high potential to 
actually increase the photosynthetic capture of carbon released into the 
atmosphere (provided that other conditions in the environmental do not 
hinder this process). The plants on land will grow faster causing more 
productive vegetation. This will result in a balance between the two 
opposing carbon processes, which will be decisive for the future changes in 
carbon feedback from the Arctic and into the global climate. So far though, 
calculations on this balance have not been fruitful.124 
 
The Arctic warming and melting has had a major environmental impact on 
the region. Previously common species such as polar bears are now 
becoming endangered, while fish never before found in the area now appear 
and temperate forests replace what once was tundra.  It is now possible to 
grow crops successfully on Greenland, and the access to fish, timber, 
minerals and freshwater is greater than ever.125 
 
Oil spills would cause more severe harm in the Arctic than in most other 
oceans. So far it has been impossible to find adequate technology or 
infrastructure to clean up after oil spills in broken sea ice. When weather 
conditions are harsh and conditions hazardous, spill response could be 
severely delayed. Apart from the problem that spill response often is a 
lengthy process, oil stays in the Arctic waters longer than anywhere else. It 
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can be locked within the ice cover, and fades much slower than it would in 
warmer temperatures.126 
 
The most important measure to reduce Arctic warming is to mitigate GHG 
emissions. This cannot be done overnight though, and therefore there is a 
need to also work on reducing the so-called Short-Lived Climate Forcers 
(SLCF) such as black carbon, tropospheric ozone and methane. Especially 
black carbon has been reported to have a major effect on Arctic warming, 
both through warming of the atmosphere and through its accelerating effect 
on the ice and snow melting. Given this, reducing black carbon emissions 
could mean a slowing of ice melt and limiting the fast warming of the 
Arctic.127 
 
3.2 Security and Military Aspects 
By the middle of the last century, military growth and the development of 
new sorts of weapons was a matter of fact. Military planners of the USA, 
the USSR, and their allies at that time cast their looks on the Arctic. By the 
1980’s the Arctic in fact had become the “most probable bridgehead for 
World War III”128, and the East-West military confrontation had reached a 
critical stage in the region. The turning point came when Soviet leader 
Gorbachev in the middle of the 1980’s proposed a number of initiatives to 
relax international tension and reduce the ongoing arms race. One proposal 
– the Murmansk Initiative from 1987 - also suggested a six-point program 
aimed at creating a new legal regime in the Arctic, built on the principles of 
neighborhood as well as mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.129    
 
In the 1900’s the Cold War era so came to an end, which meant a reduction 
in both military and political tension, and steps were taken towards 
international cooperation and stability. Disarmament proceeded through for 
example the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 and the 2010 START 
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between Russia and USA. NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) was also formed during this period. This 
change had its effect on the Arctic as well as the rest of the world, making 
the theme of security issues shift from more traditional military aspects to 
other less tangible ones like the environment.130 Aspects of environmental 
security do include military activities (one example is nuclear accidents, 
another is pressures on the environment from chemical weapons being 
destroyed as a result of disarmament), but also other factors such as 
exploitation of natural resources, oil spill as a result of transportation and 
sea traffic issues.131 This new and much broader security concept is a policy 
field that needs to be given careful and thorough consideration in the Arctic. 
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But this is of course true also when looking at Arctic security in a more 
traditional sense – the weapon-oriented and national military security, that 
includes routine patrolling as well as all other aspects of normal national 
defense. Although there currently is no military tension in the area, it is 
often the host site for important military structure and army trainings and is 
often used to test new weapons and arms system, not excluding the nuclear 
weapons system of the USA and Russia.132 The military-political 
importance of the Arctic is thus still very much a matter of fact. Some 
military bases and (radar) stations have closed, and some military activities 
have seized or at least decreased. But in other parts of the region activity has 
instead increased, and new areas of land are being used for military 
purposes. Such is the case in Alaska, Northern Greenland and the Kola 
Peninsula. Marine areas in the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea have also 
seen military activities rising in extent. The military presence in the Arctic 
thus consists of multiple military structures and activities, whether it be for 
routine military defense, controlling national borders or for deploying 
nuclear weapon systems.133 The political stand seems to be that the Arctic is 
suitable for various military exercises, testing and training since it is 
relatively sparsely-populated and remote. Caution needs to be taken though, 
since military activities likely will cause environmental pollution and 
threaten both human and environmental security.134 
 
As a result of climate change, some Arctic states have undertaken a 
(although moderate) modernization of their military equipment, as well as 
made adjustments to their level and structures of force. This not so much 
because of any potential power projection in the region, but rather the fact 
that defending national sovereignty and security has become a larger issue 
since the melting ice has meant opening of important sea routes. Climate 
change is a potential threat to national sovereignty making it a relevant 
traditional security factor.135 This said, there are no indications of any rising 
tensions that could transform into armed conflicts in the Arctic. The region 
is highly stable and protected by “a well-established process of 
institutionalized international cooperation”.136 All Arctic coastal states 
except Russia are parties of NATO, making its highly unlikely that they 
would initiate any firing at one and other.137  
 
Even if the Arctic Council specifically has excluded military issues from 
their scope of cooperation138, such issues have recently emerged on the 
agenda at a meeting focused on Arctic cooperation. In 2012 the chiefs of 
defense of all eight Arctic states met and discussed the Arctic situation. This 
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could be a sign of moving towards more partnership even in a field as 
sensitive as military collaboration, and might change the image of security 
in the north.139 
 
3.3 Shipping and Maritime Governance 
3.3.1 New Opportunities 
Given that the Arctic ice is rapidly melting, is has become an inevitable fact 
that new international maritime trade routes will be established. Already 
today, shipping exists for supplying the populations of the North and 
supporting the industries of hydrocarbon and mineral resources production 
in the Arctic areas of Norway, Russia and Canada. Even cruise ships have 
begun to sail along the coast of Greenland. In recent summers it has become 
possible for smaller ships to navigate parts of the Northwest Passage. It is 
clear that the Arctic is and will be an opportunity for economic development 
and growth.140 Discussing trade routes141, three of those could virtually 
transform how international shipping is conducted between major markets. 
The first one likely to become operational is the Northern Sea Route 
through the Russian waters, which will link Asia with the northern Europe. 
The journey from Hamburg to Yokohama will be approximately 5,000 miles 
shorter than using the Suez Canal route.142 The Northwest Passage links 
North America, Europe and Asia through the seven routes available through 
Canadian Arctic waters. The passage is probably able to use during the 
summers, and will mean a 6,500-mile shorter journey than the Panama 
Canal route or a 9,000-mile shorter journey than the Cape Horn route. A 
third possible shipping route will be the transpolar route, going from the 
Bering Strait across the North Pole towards Iceland, which would mean 
5,000 miles saved compared to using the Panama Canal route.143 Many 
actors are preparing for this shift in shipping practices, and a great number 
of polar classed vessels are under construction.144  
 
Much of the expected development of the Arctic region will be dependent 
on shipping. In order to facilitate this increased international shipping, the 
infrastructure needs to be geared up and adapted to the future, and the 
navigation challenges in the Arctic needs to be appropriately handled.145 
The remoteness and special character of the Arctic will create specific 
demands for shipping taking place: Safety and environmental standards 
comparable to no other, regulations for construction standards concerning 
ships, crewing and operation requirements much higher than would be the 
case in other more easily navigated areas, widely available marine 
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insurances at reasonable costs, coastal states of the region must offer 
affordable support services on a non-discriminatory basis.146 To develop the 
new Arctic trade routes can hopefully be an opportunity not to let 
opportunism and conflict prevail, but for planning based on experience and 
insight and for an equitable and methodical cooperation.147  
 
It is important to note that just because predictions are that the Arctic will be 
ice-free during the summer, this does not mean that the sea will be able to 
navigate as one were in non-polar regions. This is why instead of calling it 
ice-free, “open water” would be more suitable. This is because there will 
still be ice, even if in smaller amounts, and this remaining ice will move in 
unpredictable patterns and the ice conditions may change significantly and 
rapidly causing major safety concerns.148 Another issue is the mapping, or 
rather lack of updated mapping, of the Arctic. On a journey one will stumble 
upon choke-points and narrow channels hard to navigate. To do so without 
sufficient charts will be even more difficult given that the fog often lies 
thick over the Arctic region, and the visibility often is limited. To send 
vessels regularly through the open Arctic waters will thus demand maritime 
training and preparations beyond what is carried out today.149  
 
Since the cost of ice breakers is very high, and there are not a large number 
around for use, many vessels crossing the Arctic Ocean do so unescorted. 
Canada and Russia use their ice breakers only for the most icy parts of the 
ocean. If anything goes wrong and a breaker is not present, the risk of 
disaster is alarming and the lack of rescue services in the Arctic will present 
itself clearly. The lack of, and expensive character of, ice breakers will 
cause a halt to the increase in Arctic shipping. It will take a long time until 
the ice breaker industry can keep track with maritime transport of goods.150  
 
The routes that most likely will be used are, as mentioned, located in remote 
areas of the Arctic. Even though some Arctic shipping-safety control zones 
do exist (for example in the Canadian areas), the service available for 
shipping vessels cannot compare with the “regular” sea routes. There is a 
great need to resolve this and other shortcomings, for example through a 
larger number of harbors where vessels can stock up on supply and make 
reparations after possible ice-damages, and also improve the capacity for 
salvage and pollution response and search and rescue operations.151 
Regarding pollution response, the Arctic has specific needs due to its low 
temperatures and circulation patterns, which means that even “a low 
“dissipation rate” prevails for a pollutant such as oil”. In theory, it only 
takes a few ships to threaten the Arctic environment, since “a small 
discharge of a pollutant such as fuel oil can cause significant damage.”152 
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Given the risks here presented, it is clear that Arctic shipping requires more 
demanding rules, regulations and best practices standards than other 
maritime regions do. The question is at what level should such regulations 
be adopted.153  
 
3.3.2 Legal Framework for Arctic Shipping  
International Level 
Arctic shipping will fall under the United Nations (UN) body International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and its governance structures (including 
processes, rules and standards) for international shipping. These promote 
“the highest practicable standards for maritime safety, navigation efficiency 
and vessel-source pollution, encourages the removal of discriminatory 
practices by States and supports the availability of shipping services to 
world commerce.”154 The maritime safety tools developed by the IMO can 
help promote suitable construction, equipment and seafaring standards for 
the Arctic region. Such tools can be found for instance in the International 
Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), adopted in 1974, consisting 
of a large range of rules for basically all aspects of ship construction, 
equipping, crewing and operation.155 All rules applicable to the Arctic are 
ones of general character though, and even if voluntary guidelines are in 
force, no mandatory regulations governing the particular challenges of 
navigating the Arctic Ocean exist.156  
 
Through the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships 1973/78 (MARPOL) the IMO has – as mentioned in section 2.1.3 – 
the authority to designate special areas where the marine environment is 
particularly sensitive and vessel discharges therefore are further restricted. 
Of relevance for a study of Arctic shipping, it should be noted that the 
Antarctic Waters, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea have been designated as 
such sensitive areas. The IMO can demonstrate the need of special 
protection for certain areas by adopting special mandatory measures and/or 
establish a so called Particular Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) and taking 
associated protective measures (APMs). Today, the PSSA nearest the Arctic 
is located in Western European waters. To further protect and conserve the 
environment, the IMO has also approved routing measures. Neither of the 
now listed protective measures have yet been taken in Arctic waters.157 The 
IMO has not ignored the safety issues particular for the Arctic though, and 
has adopted, for example, Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters158 
and has proposed new regional navigation areas (NAVAREAs) in the 
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Arctic, an approach that would impose further responsibilities on affected 
coastal states.159  
 
Given that no MARPOL “special areas” exist within the Arctic Ocean, 
MARPOL permits certain discharge levels, such as oily water discharges up 
to 1/15k-1/30k (maximum allowed discharge quantity being e.g. 1/15,000 of 
the cargo capacity or cargo carried) and a maximum discharge rate of 30 
liters/nm no closer than 50 nm from nearest land. Discharge of plastic is 
prohibited, packing materials further than 25 nm from land and other 
materials (such as glass, metal and paper) further than 12 nm from land are 
allowed though.160 Perhaps these rules aren’t enough. This seems to be the 
opinion of Canada and Russia, who both have a zero-tolerance against oil 
discharge.161 One could argue that the Arctic needs to be granted some 
special area designation under MARPOL, but the region today has a 
shortage of ports being able to receive the oil and garbage that would be 
prohibited to dump in the ocean.162 In order to designate special areas and 
for example set higher discharge standards or mandatory routing schemes as 
APMs under MARPOL, the Arctic coastal states could join forces and 
propose the entire Arctic region becoming a large PSSA, or groups 
of/individual Arctic states could submit proposals concerning different parts 
of the Arctic Ocean. A relatively limited amount of shipping could prove 
sufficient for PSSA designation, if shipping qualitatively has potential to 
seriously pose a threat to the marine environment.163 Apart from Russia, the 
Arctic states have little experience with marine salvage. A salvor should use 
the best environmental option to take the salved vessel somewhere safe – 
this equation can be challenging due to ice conditions and coastal state 
regulations.164  
 
Vessel-source pollution is also dealt with in UNCLOS Part XII, where 
provisions are directed at flag and coastal states. The general UNCLOS rule 
is that prescriptive jurisdiction practiced by a coastal or flag state is linked 
to the term generally accepted international rules and standards 
(GAIRAS). This especially means the technical rules adopted within the 
IMO. UNCLOS stipulates a mandatory prescriptive jurisdiction for flag 
states in regard to vessel-source pollution, which must at least reach 
GAIRAS level. There is only a voluntary mandate for coastal state 
prescriptive jurisdiction regarding vessel-source pollution, and if a state uses 
this alternative the domestic rules cannot be harsher than the GAIRAS 
level.165  
 
The Arctic Council (AC) is not an observer at the IMO (nor is the IMO at 
the AC) and no cooperation agreement exists between the two. Even if the 
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member states of the AC participate in the work of the IMO they do so 
individually and not as a part of the greater Arctic community, possibly 
failing to “project a systematic regional approach to Arctic issues at IMO”. 
Industry as well as NGO’s concerned with the Arctic can participate in IMO 
meeting and affect rules and standards being adopted. It might also be a 
good idea for the IMO to apply for observer status is the Arctic Council.166  
 
Regional Level 
UNCLOS Art. 122-123 offer a definition of semi-enclosed sea as a sea 
surrounded by a number of states and connected to another part of the sea 
by a narrow outlet or a sea consisting of the Territorial Seas/EEZs of at least 
two coastal zones. The definition is there to give ground to “encourage 
regional cooperation in marine areas within such a constraining 
geography”.167 The Arctic coastal states have an obligation to either directly 
or through a suitable regional organization endeavor: 
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation 
of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international 
organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this 
article.168 
 
States are also under an obligation to undertake regional cooperation, as 
appropriate, to formulate international rules, standards and practices in line 
with UNCLOS, to protect and preserve the marine environment, paying 
attention to special regional features.169 
 
The fact that the Arctic Council only partially consists of Arctic coastal 
states has had certain implications for the work on regulating shipping 
within the AC, which has been primarily focused on developing a 
knowledge base for general issues and cooperation in the fields of 
contingency planning and response.170 The Arctic coastal states do not shy 
away from stepping outside their Arctic Council cooperation when this can 
be beneficial. Apart from being members of the AC, the five coastal states 
also have a separate form of cooperation, formed through the Ilulissat 
Declaration171 by the ministers in 2008. This declaration touched on three 
key issues:  
First, in response to proposals for a new comprehensive international legal 
regime for the Arctic Ocean, they stated that such a comprehensive legal 
instrument was unnecessary. Second, presumably as an assertion of their 
rights as coastal States, they espoused their readiness to undertake 
responsible management by using the existing framework for the 
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international law of the sea. Third, and most significantly for shipping 
governance, they expressed the common intention to continue working 
together directly and through IMO to strengthen existing and develop new 
safety measures to prevent and reduce vessel-source pollution.172 
 
Because of the potential mineral resources hidden under the Arctic ice as 
well as the above mentioned shipping and trade possibilities that will be 
available in the foreseeable future, the Arctic is of great interest not only to 
Arctic states, but to the rest of the world as well. It seems as though non-
Arctic states have a non-territorial interest that the Arctic area is being 
properly governed. UNCLOS recognizes such outside interest in regional 
seas by obliging the Arctic (regional) states to “endeavor to invite other 
States or international organizations to cooperate with them on furthering 
cooperation in the region”173. Such a possibility has been given to outside 
states by the AC through the concept of Observer status in the Council.174 
All in an, it could be stated that:  
Clearly the regional governance level has an important role to play in the 
governance of Arctic shipping, but most likely as a political rather than a 
standard-setting forum. It has the potential to enable Arctic States to better 
coordinate their national and IMO efforts to regulate shipping. It is probably 
in the collective interest of Arctic States to have the Arctic Council assume a 
more visible institutional presence at IMO, thus alerting the rest of the 
maritime community that a viable regional cooperative arrangement exists 
which is beneficial to international shipping. The Arctic Council also has the 
potential of further engaging important and interested non-Arctic States or 
organizations, such as the EU.175  
 
National Level? 
National governance can (as stated above) be practiced through the use of 
UNCLOS Art. 234, which enables coastal states to set higher standards for 
pollution prevention as a result of shipping than the international norm set 
by the IMO176. National standards then become an add-on to the protection 
standards already in force:177 Canada adopted the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act178 (AWPPA) in 1970, applicable to waters north of 60° and 
(by amendment in 2008) encompassing Canada’s entire EEZ. Regulations 
within the AWPPA include designation of shipping-safety control zones (so 
far 16 such zones have been designated), polar standards for ships, zero 
discharges from ships, requirements for an ice navigator aboard, and 
voluntary (to be made mandatory) reporting to the Arctic Canada Traffic 
System (NORDREG) for any ships weighing over 300 tons that enters the 
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Canadian Arctic Waters.179 The Russian Federation has also legislated 
requirements for safety and pollution-prevention for vessels passing through 
the Northern Sea Route, setting out “standards for polar classes, ship 
inspection, emergency and repair supplies, ice-navigation qualifications of 
the master, pilotage requirements (compulsory in some straits), ice-
breaking, civil liability for pollution damage, a compulsory notification 
system including advance permission to use the route, and fees for services. 
Ship transits are monitored by the authorities”.180 States that use the Art. 
234-exception will do so without any IMO approval on their adopted 
regulations. Instead, UNCLOS settled for requiring that the national 
regulations be based on the best scientific evidence available.181  
 
To protect the Arctic marine environment in a time of increased shipping 
activity, unilateral efforts are not enough though. When taking place on the 
high seas (such as through the transpolar route), shipping is regulated by the 
IMO, and not any single state. Besides, when the Territorial Sea or straits 
are being used for international navigation – the right of innocent/transit 
passage will apply and states may not be able to enforce any Art. 234-
regulations.182 Because of this, “a better approach to the use of Article 234 
is to use the powers conferred as part of a broad cooperative approach to the 
setting of polar shipping rules and standards.” Some rules, of more strict 
safety character, would anyhow need to be obtained through the IMO.183 A 
possible conclusion is that:  
Arctic coastal States (in consultation with the other Arctic and interested 
States, possibly using the Arctic Council as a vehicle) should take the lead 
in IMO to establish appropriate safety and environmental rules and 
standards, and then use their Article 234 powers to effectively enforce 
them. It is reasonable to interpret Article 234 as providing a basis for them 
to exercise a leadership mandate for this purpose.184  
 
3.3.3 Mandatory Arctic Guidelines 
As has been indicated, there is a need to legislate on marine protected areas 
to protect them from the consequences of increased shipping in the Arctic. 
A large step in the right direction would be to adopt and implement a legally 
binding Polar Code – drawn up by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), to replace the voluntary Polar Guidelines currently applicable. Such 
a legally binding instrument is expected to be in place by 2015-2016.185 The 
(voluntary) guidelines already in force address the special conditions of 
Polar waters, such as remoteness and dangers associated with ice. They 
include a Circular (MSC. 1/Circ. 1184) on Enhanced Contingency Planning 
Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote from Search and 
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Rescue (SAR) Facilities (2006). This part urges passenger ships companies 
operating in areas far from an search and rescue facilities to develop its own 
emergency plans which could preferable include “voyage pairing” – 
meaning that other passenger ships located in the same area will be used as 
SAR facilities. Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships 
Operating in Remote Areas (2007), further urges passenger ships to produce 
detailed voyage and passage plans. These should address issues such as safe 
distance from icebergs, safe speeds in ice-covered waters and which areas to 
not enter. Further parts of the Polar Guidelines provide requirements for 
construction and technics of Polar Class Ships.186 For example, such a ship 
should not carry any pollutants against the outer shell of the vessel, in order 
to minimize the risk of contaminating the water if an accident should occur. 
It should also be equipped with enclosed lifeboats and carry survival kits fit 
for Polar weather conditions.187 Operational suggestions are also included, 
such as: Each Polar classed vessel should have at least one qualified ice 
navigator aboard. As stated above, the process of making these Guidelines 
mandatory is currently underway. This was originally meant to happen in 
2012, but the various discussions concerning geographical scope of 
application, appropriate training to require for vessel personal and ice 
navigators and many other aspects of such a mandatory instrument have 
taken quite some time.188 
 
Even if the IMO has developed rules and standards for shipping, it is 
doubtful whether these are practically useable in the Arctic. In the Arctic, 
evacuation from ships may very well happen by foot on ice blocks instead 
of on free water in lifeboats, and a ship may be prohibited from changing its 
course when approaching another ship because of surrounding ice 
conditions.189 The lack of full safety rules is made visible also through the 
somewhat narrow scope of the Polar Guidelines – and the fact that these 
Guidelines on shipping construction and operational standards are not 
mandatory.190 The Guidelines do not include any liability or insurance 
requirements, nor any discharge, emission, navigation or contingency 
standards, solely CDEM (construction, design, equipment and manning) 
standards. Many of these though focus on mitigating vessel-source 
pollution. The guidelines are only applicable for international voyages of 
ships according to the SOLAS definition, which excludes naval vessels and 
smaller fishing/cargo vessels.191 
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3.4 The Arctic Council and Regional 
Cooperation 
3.4.1 Development and Legal Status 
Arctic cooperation in a modern form started in the late 1980’s, and was back 
then entirely focused on environmental issues. In 1991, the Rovaniemi 
Declaration was signed, and after this followed the adoption of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy192 (AEPS), a goal-oriented document 
lacking any real resemblance to an international treaty.193 AEPS included 
very ambitious objectives and action plans to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the pollution problems identifiable. The strategy also required the 
Arctic states to form working groups for the various pollution problems at 
hand and founded the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) 
in order to measure and assess the effects of anthropogenic pollutants in the 
Arctic. AEPS stressed the importance of UNCLOS and the need to follow 
international environmental treaties in force, and also encouraged the Arctic 
states to become parties to significant international instruments with the aim 
to protect the marine environment. Cooperation in the fields of Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) as well as Conservation of 
the Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) was also emphasized and structured.194  
In 1993, the Arctic states convened in Nuuk, Greenland, where they 
extended the institutional structure presented in AEPS. The EPPR and 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) were dubbed working 
groups as well, and a task force for sustainable development saw the light of 
day. Another evolvement of the cooperation was the inclusion of meetings 
of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO). A meeting 1996 in Inuvik, Canada then 
further followed up AEPS. This meeting meant the start for the Arctic 
cooperation in its current form, and a few months later the establishment of 
the Arctic Council was a fact.195 The objectives widened, to now include 
common Arctic issues, focusing on issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the region. The use of common issues as a 
concept meant giving the AC a very wide mandate. The only explicit 
exclusion was that the cooperation did not include matters relating to 
military security.196 
 
The procedural rules of the AC include decision-taking by consensus of the 
members (members are the eight Arctic states – USA, Canada, Russia, 
Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) and representation by 
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indigenous peoples organizations labeled Permanent Participants (PP’s) who 
must be consulted prior to any decision-making.197 The SAO’s meet 
regularly and produce recommendations for the ministers of the Arctic 
Council member states to approve through signing a declaration at their 
biennially meetings.198 The process within this Arctic cooperation has 
doubtlessly become more and more institutionalized, even if the definition 
of what the cooperation should be labeled in the international law 
community is ambiguous. This seems to fit in to recent practice though, 
where new kinds of cooperation arrangements have replaced traditional 
concepts such as treaties and international organizations.199 
 
At the same time, the above-mentioned ambiguity in some ways creates a 
problem, since the “legal status of the cooperation process in general and of 
the instruments adopted in the process in particular” is unclear. Even if the 
AEPS document is viewed upon as binding, it is unclear how and to what 
extent. Available comments regarding the legal status of AC is reluctant to 
call it an intergovernmental organization.200 Even so, its agreements should 
be considered binding in international law based on the aspect that the 
decisions are not taken by any organ of the council, but through meetings of 
participating state parties.201 
 
Although it might have had some weaknesses in legal terms in the past202, 
the institutional aspect of the AC has recently been greatly strengthened by 
the standing secretariat established in Tromsø, Norway, in 2013.203 The 
prior lack of any structural funding has also been dealt with through PSI, the 
Arctic Council Project Support Instrument. The PSI gathers funds from AC 
stakeholders and will when operational dispense these to AC projects in 
need of additional funding.204 
 
Regarding the issue of whether the Artic Council has been able to function 
as a platform for the member states, on which they can act together to fight 
global climate change, following points can be made. The AC had a 
substantive influence on the Stockholm 2001 negotiations for a Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and has agreed to support IMO 
negotiations on transforming the Polar Code into a binding instrument. 
These actions show that the AC indeed is capable of advocating a strong 
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international environmental policy.205 AC member states have also taken on 
the role of spearheading efforts on emission cuts and addressing SLCF, and 
urged the global community to follow. Other actions include their ambition 
to limit global temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius – a strong 
statement coming from states such as USA, Russia and Canada. The climate 
policies of these states fail to deliver the same will though. Canada 
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol206 in 2012, and USA never even became 
a party to begin with. Russia refrained from renewing their commitment to 
the protocol for a second term. What can be concluded from this is that 
climate policy is a major political field for these states, and Arctic 
considerations alone cannot dictate the way this policy is shaped; 207 
unfortunate, but perhaps understandable.  
3.4.2 Legislative Work Protecting the Arctic  
3.4.2.1 Search and Rescue Cooperation 
Through the 2011 Ministerial (Nuuk) Declaration, the Arctic Council 
announced their first successfully negotiated legally binding agreement – 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic.208 This SAR Agreement was concluded between the 
governments of the eight Arctic Council member states, who are all 
members of UNCLOS/accepts majority of UNCLOS principles as part of 
Customary Law (USA) and the two “related” conventions: The 1979 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue and the 1944 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. The International Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR) provide guidance on 
the implementation of the SAR Agreement.209 The Arctic states entered into 
the SAR Agreement in order to strengthen the cooperation and coordination 
on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the region.210 Obligations 
in the agreement include that each state shall “promote the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
capability within its area” and inform the other states of changes made 
regarding its competent authorities, SAR agencies, and rescue coordination 
centers.211 To pursue the objectives of the agreement, a state shall for 
instance “take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is 
provided” and “may request assistance” from the other states if it is to 
receive information that someone appears to be in distress and immediately 
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forward all relevant information to a state in which territory there is reason 
to believe that a person, vessel or aircraft is in a state of emergency.212 If a 
state for SAR purposes needs to enter into another state’s territory, the 
second state shall advice on this enquiry and apply the quickest border 
crossing procedure possible.213 Other provisions include an “obligation” for 
states to enhance cooperation in SAR matters, exchange information that 
may improve the effectiveness of SAR operations and promote mutual SAR 
cooperation by “giving due consideration to collaborative efforts” – such as 
conducting joint SAR exercises and training.214  
 
Not only is the SAR Agreement built on “soft” responsibilities and 
obligations of the shall and may character, a participating state may simply 
withdraw from the agreement by notifying the depositary 6 months in 
advance.215 It seems possible to conclude that this instrument is more a 
manifestation of the good will to cooperate between the Arctic states rather 
than a strong legal instrument.  
 
One Russian view seems to be that the agreement is focused on better 
regional cooperation and coordination with the purpose of offering free help 
to people when in distress in the Arctic Ocean – no matter what their reason 
for being there is. The issue of salvage of ships or aircraft is outside the 
scope of the agreement, but it should not be ruled out that subsequent 
agreements will also address this area of cooperation. Even if the principles 
set out in the SAR Agreement build on international instruments formerly in 
place, it has not solely copied their contents – it has a significant added 
value, and is thus a major contribution to Arctic law.216  Clarifying the SAR 
responsibility zones of the parties to the Agreement is significant in a 
practical sense, since it will eliminate possible misjudgments regarding who 
has the responsibility to initiate and coordinate a pending operation. This 
will lead to a quicker search and rescue-process, with fewer 
misinterpretations and a clearer labor division. Provisions included in the 
agreement are ones of utmost importance since saving lives is an extremely 
time sensitive operation.217 With this agreement, there is no longer any need 
to spend time on lengthy interstate communications before action can be 
taken. All known phases of rescue activities have now been assigned with 
responsible actors.218 Entry into the territory of another Arctic state has also 
been made easier. It is now a legally binding obligation to administer border 
crossings through the most expeditious procedure possible during a SAR 
operation.219 Despite all its advantages, cooperation on SAR cannot 
substitute efforts to enhance national capabilities – and such should 
therefore be prioritized. Hopefully such efforts will only gain from the light 
shed on SAR in the Arctic during the negotiations for the Arctic Council 
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SAR agreement. Russia has already taken steps to improve national SAR 
capacity, and has decided to establish (by 2015) ten new stations for SAR 
monitoring and coordination in towns and ports along the Northern Sea 
Route. Today’s Arctic SAR capabilities are limited, but could be 
strengthened by the use of military vessels and airplanes in the near 
distance. This has not been discussed under the SAR agreement 
negotiations, and is not dealt with in the final product. At the chief of 
defense meeting in 2012 is was a major subject of discussion though. The 
possibility to cooperate with the military to implement the agreement would 
be a major asset.220 
 
3.4.2.2 Oil Spill Prevention and Response 
Recently, at the 2013 Ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, the Arctic 
Council signed the second legal instrument negotiated within it’s auspices. 
This was the Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (Oil Spill Agreement). Also this agreement was 
concluded between the governments, and referred to other international 
legal instruments – such as the 1990 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation and the 1969 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties. The preamble expressed consciousness of “the 
threat from marine oil pollution to the vulnerable Arctic marine 
environment and to the livelihoods of local and indigenous communities”, 
“that in the event of an oil pollution incident, prompt and effective action 
and cooperation among the Parties is essential in order to minimize damage 
that may result from such an incident” and “the Parties’ obligation to protect 
the Arctic marine environment”.221 
 
Once more, the objectives focus on strengthened cooperation, coordination 
and mutual assistance, this time in order to protect the marine environment 
from oil pollution.222 Each state shall keep a national system to ensure a 
prompt and effective response to oil pollution incidents, including 
contingency plans, and establish a minimum level of oil spill combating 
equipment, exercises and training programs and plans for response in case 
of an oil spill incident.223 Many provisions within the agreement concern 
contact points and exchange of information between parties. If an oil spill 
occurs and this is likely to affect the interests of another state, the state 
which was first aware of the spill shall without delay inform the second state 
of the situation and what measures have been taken.224 The importance of 
monitoring is also noted, and the agreement encourages the parties to work 
together and conclude bi- and/or multilateral agreements. A state may 
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request assistance from another state in case of an oil pollution incident, and 
the latter state shall then cooperate and provide assistance. Afterwards, the 
helping state shall be reimbursed by the state requesting the help.225 To 
promote cooperation and coordination, the parties shall endeavor “to carry 
out joint exercises and training”.226 To assist in the implementation of the 
agreement, the parties thereto shall develop Operational Guidelines.227  
 
To settle any potential disputes concerning application/interpretation, direct 
consultations shall be used. Also this agreement has an easy exit for a state 
wishing to withdraw, where the only demand is a notification six months in 
advance.228  
 
Apart from the recent AC Agreement, there is a vast number of 
bilateral/regional instruments in force to protect and prepare the Arctic for 
environmental disasters such as oil spills. These include a 1983 bilateral 
agreement between Canada and Denmark, a 1988 bilateral agreement 
between Canada and USA (including the provision that all US icebreakers 
passing through Canada’s internal waters will need consent to do so), a 1992 
bilateral agreement between Norway and Russia on Cooperation on 
Environmental Matters, the 1993 Nordic Agreement focused on monitoring 
maritime zones and cleaning after potential pollution incidents, the 1994 
bilateral agreement between Norway and Russia for cooperation on oil 
pollution combat in the Barents Sea, a joint contingency plan of USA and 
Russia concerning pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and the 
Canada-USA Joint Marine Contingency Plan.229  
 
Despite it being a primary concern for oil spill situations, there is today no 
global instrument/governance body comprehensively regulating offshore 
hydrocarbon activities. The various regulations at least brushing on the issue 
are: UNCLOS Art. 133, that identifies hydrocarbon as a resource for which 
the UNCLOS relevant provisions do apply, meaning that offshore drilling 
must be done in accordance with the Convention. The relevant provisions 
are found in Part XII, Section 5, which states that coastal states shall, 
through adopting regulations and taking other necessary measures, prevent, 
reduce and control marine pollution as a result of seabed activities within 
the Continental Shelf. Regulations must at least be on par with international 
standards. Regional harmonization is desired and states shall work together 
to establish global/regional rules, standards and practices to mitigate marine 
environmental pollution. The fact that no real global rules apart from 
MARPOL exist makes the reference to international standards as a 
minimum level of protection rather innocuous. MARPOL includes 
fixed/floating platforms in its definition of what constitutes as a ship, why 
also the provisions therein at least must be followed (discharge and emission 
standards). On a regional level, also OSPAR contains some provisions on 
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offshore activities. Many regional and bilateral agreements generally 
dealing with pollution of the marine environment also include provisions on 
offshore hydrocarbon activities.230  
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4 The Nordic Perspective 
The Nordic states have a very pragmatic and cooperative view on Arctic 
development. Important steps within this development seem to be keeping 
the Arctic a security policy-wise low tension area, strengthening the role of 
the AC and other cooperative forums active in the region, work together 
with the Arctic states to form a common policy and plans for concrete 
projects benefitting the region, promote the involvement of the EU in the 
Arctic future and work to ensure that the Arctic development follows the 
regulations within international law.231  
 
4.1 Views on Measures Taken 
Section 3 made the attempt to briefly evaluate the work of the Arctic done 
so far. From a Nordic perspective, the following observations are 
significant. Denmark holds the view that the AC needs to advance, and take 
the step from being a decision-shaping to a decision-making organization.232 
Finland is of the opinion that the recommendations developed within the AC 
are a good basis for “furthering joint goals”. To complement this, the AC 
could “look at international treaties central to the Arctic Region and identify 
potential regulatory gaps and overlaps”. It would also be fruitful to expand 
the AC activities to include other sectors that would add important value.233 
Iceland seems to share the view that there is room for improvement 
regarding the AC, and states the importance of promoting and strengthening 
the Council – making it the most important consultative forum for dealing 
with Arctic issues – and making it the forum for international decision-
making on Arctic issues.234   
 
Oil Spill Prevention and Response 
The Arctic Council Oil Spill Agreement has been criticized for not being 
sufficiently obligating. The Nordic Council has expressed concern that 
cleaning up after an oil spill has occurred might be closely to impossible, 
given the technical challenges and harsh weather conditions in the region. 
The Agreement, though being a step in the right direction, is not enough. 
The better solution would be an agreement which legally binds the Arctic 
states to implement the at each given time best practice in national 
legislation regarding oil- and gas exploitation in the Arctic region.235 At the 
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same time, the Nordic Council states that the two AC legally binding 
instruments are of an importance that cannot be overstated, and they show 
the transformation of the AC from an advisory body into a more politically 
and practically influential one.236 
 
4.2 Future Needs 
It is the Swedish opinion that while functioning well as something 
resembling an “international organization”, the AC preferably could widen 
its mandate to also include future important issues such as a common 
security policy, infrastructure and economic development. To achieve this it 
is thus important to strengthen the AC in both an institutional and political 
way.237  Legal developments needed in the Arctic region have been pointed 
out by Sweden as the following: An effective international agreement to 
minimize and ultimately eliminate mercury emissions, regional cross-border 
cooperation to enable SAR operations and stricter security regulations for 
transportation at sea and the adoption and entry into force of the IMO 
mandatory Polar Code.238 
 
The Danish strategy for the Arctic has also spotted a few areas in which 
legal development could be needed. It is pointed out that while UNCLOS 
provides a solid foundation for Arctic maritime cooperation, “there may be 
a continuous need for more detailed regulating of certain sectors”. The SAR 
agreement is presented as an example of such.239 The establishment of 
internationally high safety standards for ship navigation is also mentioned, 
as is the necessity of adopting the IMO Polar Code.240 Also in the field of 
maritime safety, Denmark has expressed the need to introduce global rules 
of binding character for navigating in the Arctic, pressing the high priority 
to within the IMO conclude an agreement focusing on global regulation of 
shipping. If it proves impossible to reach such an agreement based on global 
rules, non-discriminatory regional safety and environmental rules taking 
into account international law (such as UNCLOS provisions on ice-covered 
waters) could be implemented after consultation with the Arctic states.241 
The Danish strategy also addresses the need to continuously enforce the 
own sovereignty, not at least because of the increased activity that is 
expected in the region, but also notes the importance on cooperation that 
should increase regarding surveillance of the Arctic and could be enhanced 
in regard to the tasks of armed forces.242 Denmark has also expressed the 
will to actively work to establish an international liability and compensation 
convention for pollution damage as a result of offshore oil exploitation, 
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under the auspices of the IMO (or other international forum).243 
Furthermore, Denmark will implement and ratify the OPRC-HNS 
(Hazardous and Noxious Substances) Protocol on compensation and liability 
for damages arising from hazardous and noxious substances, as well as the 
Ballast Water Convention (protects the marine environment from invasive 
species).244 In its strategy for the Arctic, Denmark states that the starting 
point for the strategy is the assumption that “requisite international legal 
basis” has already been achieved245, a statement likely meaning that within 
the international law there are rules that could govern the Arctic well – but 
given the above mentioned need for various legal instruments it is unlikely 
that Denmark suggests that the legal work for the Arctic is done. Regarding 
the environment for example, the Kingdom of Denmark notes that it will 
work for a globally binding mercury agreement (under UNEP).  
 
Norway is also of the opinion that the presence of armed forces in the Arctic 
is necessary to meet the national security needs and to functionally manage 
crises in the region.246 Regarding climate change, Norway promises to 
spearhead efforts to achieve a climate agreement following the Kyoto 
Protocol, this time with an even more ambitious tone.247 Norway’s Arctic 
strategy points to the potential for more intensified cooperation in the 
Arctic, but also makes reference to the existing conflict of interest regarding 
future offshore petroleum exploitation. This conflict should be resolved in 
accordance with international law, and to reach a solution is very important 
to ensure a prosperous future.248 Regarding the environment, Norway will 
work for the development of a legally binding global instrument dealing 
with mercury (possibly complemented to include other metals as well).249  
 
The development of Russia could be one cause for concern according to 
Norway. Even if Russia is evolving from what it once was, it is nevertheless 
crucial to keep a trans-boundary dialogue regarding human rights, principles 
of rule of law and political rights. Since Russia’s engagement in Arctic 
issues and collaboration with Norway is needed to ensure sustainable 
resource use and sufficient environmental management, a strengthened and 
pragmatic cooperation is vital. There is also a Norwegian wish to intensify 
defense cooperation between the two states, since military contact would be 
valuable in case of an emergency or other “delicate situations”.250 Given its 
interest to collaborate closely with Russia, and to increase bilateral trade 
between the two, Norway also stresses the importance of a Russian 
WTO/OECD membership and the advantages of a free trade agreement 
between EFTA and Russia.251  
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Also Finland makes the assumption that the Arctic situation will focus on 
closer cooperation as opposed to any head-on collisions. Cooperation is 
namely the only way to deal with the challenging circumstances facing the 
region.252 Regarding transport and infrastructure, the Finnish objectives 
include harmonizing international rules on safety of shipping and 
environmental protection in the Arctic region.253 Concerning international 
regulations, treaties or other mechanisms, Finland notices a problem in the 
fact that only a few of these are specifically directed at the Arctic region or 
at specific Arctic issues. Like Denmark, Finland considers the existing 
international treaty basis – and especially UNCLOS, “a sufficient regulatory 
basis to deal with Arctic issues. The execution of UNCLOS can, if 
necessary, be supplemented by sector-based regulation that takes into 
consideration the specifics of the Arctic Ocean, as regards, for instance, the 
use of living natural resources, environmental protection or maritime 
safety”. Apart from UNCLOS, also other treaties need to be monitored. It 
may even be necessary to, when dealing with special issues, apply stricter 
and more detailed arrangements than currently in use. The AC could have a 
leading role in coordinating such.254  
 
According to its strategy for the Arctic region, it is the Finnish opinion that 
the Arctis sea routes likely will not become important international shipping 
routes for some time to come. This is due to the ice conditions, which most 
probably will continue to stay difficult for the coming decades. To break the 
remaining ice would be very costly, and the voyage could still be very risky 
because of icebergs, occasional shallow waters and drifting ice floes. When 
the sea routes do become operational in a larger scale though, coastal states 
will show an interest of gaining economically from this development, but 
also of protecting the Arctic marine environment. Issues of a legal character 
would be for example the Russian view that UNCLOS entitles them to 
monitor and collect fees for passage through the Northeast Passage, while 
Canada considers the Northwest Passage as part of their internal waters 
making only vessels with a permit allowed to enter.255 
 
In the Icelandic view all the Arctic states support UNCLOS and are 
determined to abide the Convention. Such determination cannot rule out that 
any disputes in the field of the Law of the Sea will not arise, for instance 
concerning Continental Shelf delimitation. Even if states currently 
disagreeing on delimitation have expressed their ambition to solve such 
disputes peacefully, there is no guarantee that these disagreements will not 
result in increasing tension in the Arctic region.256 
 
Iceland also notes that any militarization of the Arctic region needs to be 
prevented. Focus needs to be on cooperation instead, and bilateral 
agreements on common security interests (surveillance, maritime accidents 
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etc.) are a large part of this.  Future agreements should focus on deepening 
the cooperation on pollution prevention – given the prognosis of increased 
vessel activity in the Arctic Ocean.257 
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5 How Best to Ensure a Bright 
Arctic Future 
Moving to the more analytical and operationally focused section of this 
thesis, chapter five will discuss detected regulatory gaps for the Arctic 
region, and put forward possible solutions to them.  
 
5.1 Regulatory Gaps to Fill 
Even if the above exposition has presented many examples of legal 
instruments governing or at least addressing the Arctic region, potential 
gaps in the international governance of maritime areas have been identified, 
for example in a WWF report published in 2009.258 Concerning the Arctic 
Council, the following gaps were noticed: The Council is not empowered to 
adopt legally binding obligations, nor is it an operational body that evaluates 
whether or not its non-legally binding guidelines are being followed by the 
participants. Non-Arctic states are not allowed to participate in the AC more 
than on an observer level, which puts a limit on the role and power of the 
council.259 Widening the scope to an international legal regime, and 
focusing on activities in the High Seas, gaps consist of the lack of any 
operational regulatory regime for marine scientific research, bio-
prospecting, laying down cables and pipelines and conducting military 
activities. Up-and-coming activities such as deep-sea tourism or activities 
related to hydrocarbon sequestration are also not adequately regulated. 
There are further no demands for designating Marine Protected Areas 
(MPA’s), adopting Cross-sectoral Ecosystem-based Ocean Management or 
conducting Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s).260  
 
Looking at sectoral governance and the regulations for the marine Arctic, 
gaps can be located as follows: All Arctic states need to participate in all 
relevant international regulatory instruments; for example, it is vital that 
Russia becomes a party to the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) 90. There are no globally 
established rules concerning “special IMO discharge, emission or ballast 
water exchange standards for the Arctic marine area”. No regional approach 
has been taken to ensure that applicable international rules are being 
complied with. There are no obligatory rules of general character, global or 
regional, governing offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic.261  
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5.2 Bilateral Legal Measures as a First 
Step 
Canada and USA have recently worked together to map the continental 
shelves of concerned parts of the Arctic Ocean. The collaboration has been 
possible even though the two states have a longstanding disagreement over 
the Beaufort Sea’s maritime boundaries. The area subject to overlapping 
claims is made up of roughly 6,000 square nm of potentially hydrocarbon-
rich maritime territory.262 To solve this existing disagreement, a model can 
be used by which cooperation is built on the same science-based foundation 
as the scientific cooperation currently taking place. It would be a sort of 
hydrocarbon cross-border unitization agreement or a joint development area 
but with a much broader scope of use.263 Solutions like this one could 
exemplify how “national legal systems can interrelate to fill gaps in arctic 
governance and regulation”.264  
 
Since there is an understanding among some scholars and experts that “a 
new comprehensive treaty for management and governance of the Arctic, 
particularly along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty, is neither necessary nor 
feasible at this time”265, adopting a bi-national model could be a suitable 
middle-way solution – especially given that it will be based on the principle 
that international law, in any area, is only as strong as the national legal 
systems that implement it.266 Two states with like legal cultures combined 
with a longstanding tradition of neighborly and diplomatically characterized 
cooperation can further be presumed to easier achieve common goals and 
ambitions than a larger group consisting of all five or eight Arctic states.267 
These first-step measures towards a comprehensive bilateral Arctic 
cooperation could perhaps also be the first steps towards a joint Arctic legal 
regime. To have 3-4 groups of legal collaborations joining forces for a 
major judicial instrument, or – perhaps more likely – a governance 
approach, could prove much easier than having all independent 8 states 
doing the same. If each Arctic state already has proven its willingness to 
cooperate on a binding legal level with the neighbor, the step towards the 
clusters of neighbors also actively collaborating in the same field might not 
be at all farfetched. 
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5.3 Clarifying the Legal Status of the 
Arctic Council 
One constant “problem” for the international law is the matter of creating 
binding legal instruments. The problem arises primarily when an instrument 
lacks the regular formalities that otherwise would indicate legal obligations 
and/or rights. Such instruments are quite often looked upon as non-binding 
in a legal sense, although they might be considered as belonging to the soft 
law field, or simply as having a morally/politically binding character.268 In 
order for a new source of international law to be constructed, the states part 
thereof must accept that this in fact will happen and this must be evident. If 
one of the “participating” states does not see a new instrument as binding, it 
in fact will not be. Instruments solely looked upon as soft law has not yet 
“become an independent legal order to which states could subject their 
agreements”.269 Another aspect of the legal un-clarity that may arise in an 
international context is the status of different forums for cooperation. 
Applying this to the Arctic Council, the discussion may play out as follows: 
Can the cooperation be considered an inter-governmental organization in the 
international law meaning of the term? A criterion for qualifying as such is 
that the cooperation needs to be founded through an international 
agreement, established under international law, which creates at least one 
organ with an independent “will”. This requirement distinguishes 
organizations from purely bilateral or multilateral treaties. In such treaties 
the parties lay down a common will, but the will remains their own and does 
not transfer to any newly created body.270 Through the creation of the Arctic 
Council, the Arctic states have as a matter of fact laid down such common 
will – but it has remained their own, and no new organ has been formed to 
represent that will. All in all it must be concluded that the Council as of yet 
is no inter-governmental organization.271 Even if this is possible to conclude 
through the studies of international law doctrine, it is also conceivable that 
some states within the Arctic cooperation are of the opinion that the Council 
in fact should hold the status of an international organization.272  
 
One negative feedback the AC has received is that it fails to regularly 
evaluate whether the projects undertaken within its auspices and the 
guidelines produced by the Council manage to attain their goals.273 That the 
Council thus seems to come up short in terms of legal status as such, the 
mild character of the obligations within its two legally binding agreements 
as well as regarding follow-up and evaluation on launched projects triggers 
the suspicion that the AC might not be a legally adequate form of Arctic 
cooperation. The Council should endeavor to develop, and potentially 
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attempt to become more of a hard-law forum. Perhaps the Council could 
agree on a test-phase, and apply a more advanced form of cooperation first 
solely to the central Arctic Ocean where no Arctic state have sovereignty, 
and leave it to be further developed from thereon. 
5.4 Safeguarding a Peaceful Arctic 
Although many political and scientific statements stress that the Arctic is 
not a conflict zone, but an area of peaceful cooperation and sustainable 
development274, due consideration has to be given to the possibility of this 
not always being the case. Because of its location and potential richness of 
hydrocarbon resources, the economic advantages that can be drawn from 
controlling an area of its kind could possible tip the peaceful cooperation 
over and turn this into a hostile race among the concerned states to make as 
much money as possible. This has been known to happen in other parts of 
the world, such as in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. This 
group of numerous small islands holds a great amount of oil and gas 
resources and is highly important for the fishing industry. Having 
jurisdiction/sovereignty over the sea surrounding the islands would also 
mean the possibility of charging passing ships various tolls and fees which 
given the amount of ships passing through this gateway between Asia and 
Europe would be an ample extra income for any state.275  
 
Even if the competing states in the example above are not the same as in the 
Arctic scenario, it is appropriate to raise a note of caution – when 
comprehensive economic gain is feasible, one cannot simply rely on the fact 
that the cooperation so far has been peaceful and for sustainable objectives. 
Anything could change, and there is thus a need to be prepared for whatever 
may come. If the Arctic will not be governed by something resembling the 
Antarctic Treaty, maybe some form of dispute resolution would be 
appropriate. When taking into account the extreme sensitivity of the region, 
the need to keep the peace and let sustainability be the leading word is 
absolutely vital. The fact that Part XV of UNCLOS, the dispute settlement 
mechanism, is not applicable in case of a disagreement between USA and 
any other Arctic state (parties to UNCLOS) must classify as a significant 
gap in what the Ilulissat Declaration refers to as an “extensive international 
legal framework”.276 
 
Existing legal disputes in the Arctic concern the maritime boundary 
delimitations. The outcome of these disputes will have a large impact on the 
development within the region, because of the potential access to oil and gas 
deposits that tempts large and powerful energy companies. Because of the 
nature of the conflict, reaching a solution might require 
domestic/international energy law experts to help.277 Further it is not 
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absolutely clear which outcome these disputes will have, and it will surely 
depend on whose view on international law will prevail. For example, USA 
claims that international law appoints the Northwest Passage the status of an 
International Strait, while Canada opposes and insists that the strait is made 
up of Canadian historic waters – putting it under national control. It is also 
the Canadian view that the Arctic will be best protected through 
reinforcement of the application of domestic law. Different opinions on such 
issues will lead to the use of different legal arguments and theories for 
controlling the Arctic, as opposed to what a more partner-focused and 
collaborative approach might. Since much of the Arctic region is under 
national jurisdiction the use of domestic legal instruments is vital, and the 
concerned states have their own interest at heart when trying to meet the 
legal challenges facing the Arctic.278 
 
A NATO officer made the statement in 2010, that although disputes in the 
Arctic so far have been dealt with in a peaceful manner, climate change 
could change this. Representatives from the Russian Government Offices 
have also expressed a similar opinion.279 A few special features of the Arctic 
make a confrontational future almost plausible. The region has for a long 
time been characterized as a wealthy resource for minerals and oil, national 
explorers, scientists and engineers have taken great pride in mapping and 
examining the distant Arctic, and military presence in the area has meant 
establishing the own state as an Arctic player of great importance.280  
 
Despite possibilities of a conflict situation in the Arctic, the predominant 
view is that such a scenario is unlikely, and that the risks are exaggerated. 
Proponents of this peaceful view point to the fact that approximately 95% of 
the Arctic mineral resources lies within undisputed national boundaries and 
that the only area of any real disagreement is the Northwest Passage 
regarding whether this constitutes international or Canadian waters.281 Some 
also point to three specific factors likely to promote a harmonious 
development of the region. First, the profit motive. It is more profitable to 
develop resources already in place than argue over what potentially could 
belong to a certain state. This is shown not least by the Russian-Norwegian 
maritime border agreement from 2011, concerning the oil-rich Barents Sea 
delimitation. Second, the high costs associated with operating in the region. 
Third, the reluctance among Arctic states to give other countries the excuse 
to partake in the affairs of the region. This unwillingness to cooperate with 
the outside world was for example illustrated through the wording of the 
Ilulissat Declaration from 2008 and the possible reluctance among AC 
Member States to grant applicants the status of AC Observers.282   
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5.5 An Antarctic Treaty for the Arctic?  
5.5.1 Similarities and Differences Between the 
Polar Regions 
As described in section 2.1.1, the Antarctic is governed and protected by the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Such a solution never appeared in respect 
of the Arctic, most likely because this region was never expected to 
comprise navigable waters or be an object for major commercial 
development. When this was the forecast, there never came to be any 
comprehensive multilateral regulations or norms to govern such an 
evolution.283 
 
It is inevitable to note the differences between the two poles. The Arctic 
consists largely of water, while the Antarctic is a continent solely 
surrounded by water. The Arctic is subject to many territorial claims or 
areas already of national jurisdiction while the Antarctic is frozen to such 
claims by the ATS.284 In the minds of the general public and even 
governments though, they might have more in common. Regimes are not 
always formatted according to rational factors, which makes this “imagined 
commonality” of the Arctic and the Antarctic useful when drawing lessons 
from one or the other, for example when it comes to crafting an Arctic 
environmental protection treaty. Many Arctic states are also parties to the 
ATS, and the Antarctic Treaty regime had a joint meeting with the Arctic 
Council in 2009. Even earlier, in 2000, the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) initiated a project 
dealing with the issue of whether the Arctic could serve from being under 
the same high-quality environmental protection as the ATS provides for the 
Antarctic. No clear conclusion was reached at that time. 285  
 
In 2008, the European Parliament presented a resolution suggesting that the 
European Commission should prepare itself for international treaty 
negotiations for an Arctic protection treaty inspired by the Antarctic Treaty, 
although naturally respecting the differences between the two regions.  Such 
a treaty could initially solely cover the areas unpopulated and unclaimed in 
the middle of the Arctic Ocean. The obstacles, when it comes to borrowing 
straight from the ATS in drawing up an Arctic equivalent, is that the 
Antarctic environmental protection is not based on national systems coming 
together, but on the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting’s (ATCM’s) 
laying down international rules for environmental protection suitable for the 
entire region. In the Arctic meanwhile, the surrounding states have 
established territorial sovereignty/sovereign rights over land areas286 and 
many maritime areas as well, which are governed by the states in 
accordance with their national ambitions and judgement (whilst obeying the 
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rules of international law). This is a great structural difference that would 
make any copy/paste-model from the ATS very difficult to adopt in the 
Arctic.287  
 
If the Antarctic Treaty were to act as a model to a similar instrument in the 
Arctic many sections and paragraphs would need revising because of the 
different natures of the two poles. As previously stated, the Antarctic is a 
continent – the Arctic largely an ocean. No major trade routes pass through 
Antarctic areas, as is the case in the north.288 Another major difference 
between the two poles is the fact that while the Antarctic is lacking any 
permanent human habitation; 10 million are residing in the Arctic. The 
major difference in permanent habitants makes the Arctic subject to much 
more invasive preparations and negotiations in order to accommodate 
everyone’s prerogative.289 
 
5.5.2 The Arctic Future Calls for a Treaty-like 
Instrument 
The ATS is constructed to conserve the Antarctic environment and 
ecosystems, but the outside pressure from increased tourism and biological 
prospecting will nevertheless surely be noticed in the Antarctic as well as 
the Arctic. The ATS might then need to become internationally active and 
join forces with the AC to deliver a strong message to the world concerning 
the harmful consequences climate change is causing in the Polar Regions.290 
One could then imagine that the need for environmental protection would be 
far more highlighted if the Arctic was put under “the same” protectoral 
measures as the ATS provides for the Antarctic.  
 
When taking into account that the Arctic is currently being, and to a greater 
extent will be, used for commercial activities, it seems even more pressing 
to attain such a comprehensive protectoral regime. It is in fact so, that 
because of the ongoing changes in environmental factors and economic 
development the discussion on a need for stronger Arctic environmental 
governance has been initiated among different Arctic communities.291 
 
In conjunction to proposing an “Arctic Region Council” in 1992, professor 
Donat Pharand also drafted a proposal for an Arctic Treaty. The treaty form 
was used due to the fact that a legally binding treaty would be necessary in 
order to ensure any effective multilateral form of cooperation. A treaty 
eliminates the uncertainty that for example declarations bring with, 
regarding whether or not they can be considered legally binding. The legal 
status of a treaty also makes any breach eligible for state responsibility.292  
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The opinion of some experts is that ideally the Arctic would be managed by 
developing an overarching treaty that can guarantee that the region’s wealth 
will be extracted in an orderly and collaborative manner. Such a treaty 
should preferably include relevant UNCLOS-provisions and cover all the 
emerging issues.293 Others will at least agree that the current status of the 
Arctic is not sufficient when it comes to coping with the problems at hand, 
and that the international community is realizing that the specifics of the 
Arctic require an independent legal regime in order to protect the 
environment and make way for a sustainable development.294  
 
At the moment there are no “overarching political or legal structures that 
can provide for the orderly development of the region or mediate political 
disagreements over Arctic resources or sea-lanes”, something that makes the 
future very uncertain. In the same pace as ice turns into water, regulatory 
gaps show themselves, interstate rivalries are a matter of fact and 
newcomers such as China are being drawn to the resource-rich area.295 
Regulatory gaps show themselves already by the fact that the AC 
expressively do not deal with military security concerns, and that applying 
UNCLOS to the Arctic is not done seamlessly – because of the unique 
Arctic natural circumstances. Challenges already waiting to be resolved 
include the multiple continental shelf delimitation investigations, adopting a 
legal definition of the Northwest Passage that agrees with Canada and 
determining maritime borders in the Beaufort Sea (Canada-USA) and the 
Barents Sea (Norway-Russia). Not only is UNCLOS not specifically suited 
for the Arctic, neither are all ongoing “Arctic” issues covered by UNCLOS. 
For example, during the latter half of the last century Russia dumped near 
20 nuclear reactors into the Arctic Ocean, a hazard that needs to be cleaned 
up.296  
 
When the Arctic Council first saw the light of day and drew up the 
preconditions for cooperating, the security agenda was slimmer than is the 
case today, and excluding military security policy from the scope of 
cooperation may have seemed like an understandable decisions.  Today, this 
decision potentially should be revised. Environmental issues are a part of 
the new broader security agenda, and since environmental issues are a major 
part of Arctic governance, it could make sense that military security aspects 
are indeed considered within the scope of the Arctic Council cooperation. 
This is an issue that could be legally dealt with within a treaty-like 
instrument.  
 
It is important to stress the fact that other states besides the Arctic ones are 
extremely interested in the Arctic – and even if the Arctic (coastal) states 
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can manage without a new major legal regime – can the world? Multiple 
states have already shown a great interest in the Arctic, most likely because 
of the opportunity to use the soon available much shorter shipping routes. 
The interest is shown for example through the many applications for 
Observer status in the Arctic Council.297  
 
An instrument along the lines of an “Arctic Treaty” is unlikely though, 
under current circumstances. In order to achieve such an instrument, one 
would have to find a way to go around the legal, economic and political 
limitations that would face the negotiations. Furthermore, the potential 
parties do not seem to agree on the necessity, content and scope of an Arctic 
Treaty. One must also consider that a comprehensive treaty might not 
address/resolve the Arctic legal challenges to a full extent and that its 
efficiency thus cannot be guaranteed.298 Five years ago, the Arctic coastal 
states explicitly proclaimed that they did not see any need for the 
development of “a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern 
the Arctic Ocean”. Even if a comprehensive legal regime is not desired, this 
would not preclude any international treaty instruments dealing with 
specific issues being developed.299 
 
One specific issue that perhaps should be dealt with more thoroughly is the 
control of illegal pollution discharge from vessels, conducted by the port 
state wherein a vessel voluntarily docks. Art. 218 of UNCLOS provides the 
port state the right to investigate such discharge even if they have occurred 
outside the coastal state’s maritime zones. Port states also have the 
obligation to prevent unseaworthy ships from seafaring, according to 
UNCLOS Art. 219. A majority of the maritime regions around the world 
have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) regarding port state 
control, with the result that maritime administrations cooperate to undertake 
ship inspections when a vessel enters the port in question. The object of this 
is to ensure that the key international agreements concerning maritime 
safety and pollution are being complied with.  Given that Arctic commercial 
shipping is highly likely to significantly increase, it could be timely for the 
maritime authorities of the Arctic states to develop a new MOU specifically 
designed for port state control in the Arctic region.300 
 
Whether major legal instruments are needed or not will depend on the 
possibilities to use the Arctic in new ways – and as already pointed out in 
this thesis the outlook for natural resources exploitation and advanced 
shipping is good. Even if the Arctic community has concluded that a major 
new legal instrument to govern the region is not needed under today’s 
circumstances, with new areas of use of the region this view might 
necessarily have to change. The world’s larger oil companies have started to 
explore the possibility of drilling in the Arctic. Even if progress made so far 
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has been rather slim, oil giants like Shell have spent billions of dollars 
setting up proper oil drilling facilities in the Arctic. Given the fact that oil 
prices continue to raise, and the more accessible oil field in the world (such 
as in the Middle East) are being depleted, chances are the Arctic oil drilling 
investments and efforts will only continue to increase.301  
 
As the case often is with the law, actual development happens faster than 
the legal equivalent – technical advances for example will find themselves 
being unregulated for some time until legislators have had the opportunity to 
update domestic law in accordance. The same can be said for other areas in 
transition/progress – such as the environment. As the climate and 
environment rapidly change and make way for new opportunities to ship 
and exploit natural resources it is natural that the law cannot quite follow at 
the same pace. Given that the Arctic Ocean is an area of cooperation 
between multiple states, legal development can be expected to take even 
longer than would be the case in a domestic situation. Eight or more states 
have to agree on a legal management and governance of an area that 
potentially can be used by the entire international community, preferable so 
that all prospective economic rewards can be gained while at the same time 
the sensitive environment is being protected and actions are taken to 
minimize the negative consequences for the Arctic region as well as the rest 
of the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
301 Section inspired by The Economist Special Report, Hidden Treasure.  
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6 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the Arctic region in multiple fields could enjoy 
more advanced and comprehensive legal instruments and solutions. These 
fields could be divided into two main categories: Protecting the Arctic 
environment and developing a commercial Arctic region. The former has to 
be deemed more pressing than the latter, although neither of the categories 
is possible to disregard. When it comes to developing a commercial Arctic 
region, issues that need legal revisiting are of course maritime delimitations, 
usage of new Arctic shipping routes and economic activities such as 
hydrocarbon exploitation. These issues will also be relevant when protecting 
the environment, but then from a different perspective. Even if it would be 
fruitful and clarifying to have strict jurisdictional borders between all Arctic 
states, this should not be a priority for any developers of Arctic law. The 
areas of dispute are relatively small, most likely low in natural resources and 
will take a long time to decide the “ownership” of. Twelve years have 
passed since the Russian claim was presented to the CLCS, and yet no final 
recommendation has been produced. If this process is any indication of how 
long these delimitation issues can take to resolve, the Arctic does not have 
time to wait for it to happen. It has been projected that an ice-free Arctic is a 
reality only a few decades away, and the international community cannot 
wait around for national jurisdictions to be in place and national legislation 
to be in place to mitigate the effects of global warming in the Arctic. 
Independent of whatever oil drilling rights that will exist in the future – 
actions to protect the Arctic should be taken on a multilateral, 
internationally legally binding level, right now.  
 
It is understandably so, that the Arctic states are protective of their own 
respective interests, and will avoid any legal commitments to other states if 
possible. This is reasonable the explanation as to why some of them are 
holding back and not adopting all relevant conventions or proposing an 
Arctic cooperation with more legal depth than is the Arctic Council of 
today. It should be certain though, that if the international community is 
supposed to avoid oil spills being unattended to, GHG emissions turning 
even more ice into water and vessels shipping cargo across the North Pole 
not being able to adequately perform Search and Rescue operations, legal 
measures have to be taken in the near future. In order to achieve important 
environmental goals and objectives (such as the ones just now mentioned), 
while keeping Arctic states “comfortable”, first steps could be taken through 
which the “free” unclaimed Arctic Sea Bed and sea is turned into a zone 
where all activities are under the responsibility of the actors active therein. 
The Arctic states should there have the legal responsibilities appointed by 
the Arctic Council agreements on SAR and Oil Spill, preferably combined 
with a “penalty mechanism” if demands are not met. Such an instrument 
would show real cooperation and strive to save the environment, and not 
just be a sign of good will to do so. This advanced cooperation for the “free 
Arctic” could also include an oil drilling moratorium, before it can be 
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certain that oil spill prevention and response mechanism are set up and 
working in other Arctic areas.  
 
This above mentioned Arctic legal regime could consequently be based on 
legal obligations, that if not observed will result in a punishment along the 
lines of a fine payable to a common fund from which money can be 
withdrawn when certain Arctic issues call for it. As a starting point, the 
Arctic sea and Sea Bed not under any national jurisdiction should be 
included, and the instrument should deal with vital environmental protection 
as opposed to issues of commercial importance. Given that the AC is an up-
and-running establishment with a long history of successful research 
operations and diplomatically fruitful negotiations, the legal instrument 
should preferably be development precisely there.  After being adopted, the 
instrument should evolve to include a wider geographical scope as well as 
more “peripheral” issues. A dispute settlement mechanism for all Arctic 
states or all disputes relating to the specific Arctic issues would be wise to 
include, as would common objectives and development plans for (military) 
security cooperation.  
 
Even if a new, treaty-inspired, legal instrument for the protection and 
sustainable development of the Arctic region would be preceded by lengthy, 
compromising and surely fiery negotiations, one should not write off the 
possibility that it might be a reality in the near future. The fact that the 
Ilulissat Declaration expressively stated that the Arctic coastal states saw no 
need for any new comprehensive legal instrument should not be awarded 
too much emphasis. This conclusion was drawn solely by five Arctic states, 
in a time when Polar research had not come as far as it has today. 
Statements within this thesis, and Observer applications to the Arctic 
Council offer proof that the outside interest in the Arctic is substantial. The 
views and perspectives of all states and organizations operating in the Arctic 
region will naturally have to be attended to when creating the future legal 
framework. The mere fact that five Arctic coastal states were of one opinion 
in 2008 does not mean that the legal future of the Arctic is ascertained.  
 
There are numerous voices in the international law community affirming 
that the Arctic region is a low-tension one, and that no arms race is on its 
way concerning possible extended Continental Shelves. Today, this is most 
certainly the truth. Neither does it seem as if any Continental Shelf 
investigation is an issue that requires any further judicial measures being put 
in. The problem is likely not who has the legal rights over which area, but 
how these areas shall be governed in a larger perspective. Even if there is no 
real rush for the Arctic, the possibility of economical rewards associated 
with oil drilling and the usage of new transport routes renders much interest. 
Thus it is in reference to such activities that any legal gaps need to be 
sealed.  
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Supplement A 
 
 
Map of Arctic Shipping routes 
 
Source: http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/08/arctic-shipping-expected-
to-double-in.html 
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Supplement B 
 
 
 
Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region 
 
Source: http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/arctic.pdf 
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